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DRIVER’S LICENSE

SUSPENSIONS FOR NONPAYMENT

Driver’s License Suspensions for
Nonpayments:
A Discriminatory and
Counterproductive Policy
by MELISSA TOBACK LEVIN1*
Abstract
Driver’s license suspensions for nonpayments of traffic debt
disproportionately harm people of color and are legally untenable. Across
the country, at least seven million people have had their driver’s license
suspended for traffic debt—nonpayments of traffic tickets and
nonappearances in traffic court. As this article demonstrates, traffic debt
suspensions force people to make an impossible choice: stop driving—and
lose access to work, childcare, healthcare, food, and other basic necessities—
or keep driving, and risk criminal charges, more unaffordable fines and fees,
and even incarceration. License-for-payment laws ultimately create
conditions that parallel modern-day debtor’s prisons and are vulnerable to
several legal challenges. For these reasons, lawmakers should end
suspensions for nonpayments of traffic tickets and nonappearances in traffic
court, practices which unduly target and harm communities of color.

Introduction
Driver’s license suspensions for traffic debt disproportionately harm
people of color and will continue to do so if current laws in forty states
remain unchanged. Driver’s license suspension rates in zip codes with the
highest concentrations of people of color are generally higher than in zip
codes with the most concentrated white populations. The racial disparities
in suspension rates are consistent with data demonstrating racially
disproportionate traffic enforcement among communities of color. Indeed,
1. Melissa Toback Levin is currently a Post-Graduate Fellow with New York Law
School’s Lewis Steel Racial Justice Project.
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people of color are also disproportionately ticketed, arrested, charged, and
convicted for traffic violations and driving on suspended licenses.2
This disproportionate traffic enforcement in communities of color is
unrelated to traffic safety. It serves to finance state and municipal operations,
especially as state and local governments have become increasingly
dependent on revenue generated through traffic violations.
For people and communities, the consequences of traffic debt
suspensions are disastrous, entrenching too many in a debt trap. Poverty
makes it difficult—if not impossible—for suspended drivers to pay off the
fines and fees underlying their driver’s license suspensions.3 The onslaught
of excessive fines, fees, and costs threatens individuals’ abilities to secure
and maintain employment. A New Jersey study indicated that forty-two
percent of people lost their jobs after their driver’s licenses were suspended;
nearly half of those people could not find new jobs. Of those able to secure
new employment, eighty-eight percent reported a decrease in pay.4
Suspensions are thus counterproductive because they render individuals
even less able to pay off the fines and fees underlying their suspensions.
Traffic debt suspensions also senselessly expose people to the criminal
justice system. Seventy-five percent of people with suspended licenses
continue to drive because driving is essential for many Americans to access
basic necessities. If they are caught, they are arrested and charged with
driving with a suspended license, which is one of the most common criminal
charges around the country. Once arrested for driving with a suspended
license, people are saddled with more fines and fees, and are often jailed long

2. For instance, drivers who reside in predominantly Black zip codes in Buffalo, New
York are at least eight times as likely to be issued multiple tickets at a single traffic stop or
checkpoint than those who live in predominantly white zip codes. In New York City—where
driving with a suspended license was the fourth most charged crime in 2018—seventy-six
percent of the drivers are white, yet eighty percent of those arrested for driving with a
suspended license in 2018 were Black and Hispanic or Latinx. Data from outside New York
State corroborate these staggering racial disparities. Across the country, Black drivers are
twenty percent more likely to be pulled over than white drivers. Similarly, between 2011 and
2016 in Washington, D.C., eighty of the drivers whose licenses were suspended for
nonpayment of traffic tickets were Black—and there were even greater racial disparities
among those who were arrested for driving with a suspended license. RACIAL JUSTICE
PROJECT, Driving While Black and Latinx: Stops, Fines, Fees, and Unjust Debts, N.Y. LAW
SCHOOL 15–19 (Feb. 2020), https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1007&context=racial_justice_project.
3. In fact, research shows that the suspension rate in New York’s ten poorest zip codes
is nearly nine times higher than the suspension rate in the 10 wealthiest zip codes. Joanna
Weiss & Claudia Wilner, Opportunity Suspended, https://www.drivenbyjustice.org (last
visited Jan. 8, 2020) (analyzing data from the New York Department of Motor Vehicles 20162017).
4. See Jon A. Carnegie et al., N.J. DEP’T OF TRANS., DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS,
IMPACTS AND FAIRNESS STUDY, N.J. DEP’T OF TRANS. 56 (2007).
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enough to miss their rent payment or lose their job. This only serves to
further exacerbate the underlying issue: financial insecurity.
Suspensions issued for non-safety reasons, like traffic debt, create a
public safety problem. Most driver’s license suspensions are issued for
traffic debt—not for dangerous driving. These suspensions increase the
number of unlicensed and uninsured drivers on the road and divert law
enforcement, DMV, and court resources from true public safety problems.
Further, traffic debt suspensions are an ineffective debt collection
method that harm the overall economy. Research has revealed the practice’s
negative ramifications for GDP, tax revenue, and employers. In fact, a study
conducted in Phoenix, Arizona found that when 7,000 drivers had their
licenses reinstated, GDP increased by an estimated $149.6 million as a result,
along with increases in employment and tax revenue.5
License-for-payment laws may also be vulnerable to legal challenges.
In fact, several lawsuits challenging driver’s license suspension laws that
authorize suspensions for non-safety reasons have been filed around the
country. These laws may run afoul of “fundamental fairness,” the standard
that the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted to evaluate economic disparities in
the justice system, and also may violate the Equal Protection Clause. The
laws additionally may contravene federal agency regulations that implement
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which could jeopardize billions of
dollars in federal funding for states, their subdivisions, and their
municipalities. Further, if courts were to find that the Eighth Amendment
applies to traffic debt suspensions, they might also find that license-forpayment laws violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against
excessive fines. These laws may run afoul of “fundamental fairness,” the
standard that the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted to evaluate economic
disparities in the justice system, and also may violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Additionally, if courts were to find that the Eighth Amendment
applies to traffic debt suspensions, courts might also find that li- cense-forpayment laws violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against
excessive fines. Further, the laws additionally may contravene federal
agency regulations that implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which could jeopardize billions of dollars in federal funding for states, their
subdivisions, and their municipalities. In sum, license-for-payment laws
must be changed.
I. Overview of License-For-Payment Laws
In general, traffic tickets come with a deadline requiring the person
ticketed to either pay the ticket or appear in court or before a traffic violations
5.

Infra note 74.
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agency to contest the ticket. Many laws do not allow for a reduction, waiver,
or deferment of payment, a partial payment or payment plan, nor community
service as an alternative to payment.
If a person admits they are guilty or are found guilty by a judge, they
are assessed a fine, and given a payment deadline. If a person does not pay
by the deadline, the court or traffic violations agency typically notifies the
relevant Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), which sends a notice to the
person seeking payment within a prescribed time frame. If the ticket remains
unpaid, then the DMV usually suspends the person’s license. This is referred
to as a failure to pay (FTP) suspension. If a person contests their ticket and
then does not appear, or if the ticket requires a court appearance and the
person does not appear for it, the DMV sends a subsequent notice to the
person. If the person does not pay or appear by the deadline, the DMV
suspends the person’s license. This is referred to as a failure to appear (FTA)
suspension.
Additionally, for FTA suspensions, courts generally enter automatic
findings of guilt and impose fines, which if unpaid, become FTP
suspensions—the result of one traffic ticket then becomes multiple driver’s
license suspensions. When a driver cannot afford a traffic ticket, he or she
has little incentive to come to court. Thus, poverty is a driver of both FTP
and FTA suspensions. As fines and fees quickly accumulate, the reality for
too many becomes permanent driver’s license suspension because they
cannot afford to pay the fines and fees required to have their licenses
reinstated.
II. People of Color Disproportionately
Suffer from Driver’s License Suspensions
Because states report data using various methods, it is difficult to
precisely measure the impacted population nationally. However, available
data from several jurisdictions confirm that driver’s license suspensions have
a pervasive disproportionate impact on people of color.
This
disproportionate impact is not surprising given that people of color are
disproportionately subjected to traffic stops, which helps to drive the
disproportionate number of driver’s license suspensions communities of
color experience.
Between January 2016 and April 2018, New York issued almost 1.7
million driver’s license suspensions for nonpayments of traffic tickets and
nonappearances in traffic court.6 These traffic debt suspensions were
strongly correlated with race.7 In 2016, over 4.35% of the driving-age
population in New York had their driver’s licenses suspended for not paying
6.
7.

Weiss and Wilner, supra note 3.
Id.; see infra Appendix 1 for additional data explaining this correlation.
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or appearing to contest traffic tickets, amounting to 679,000 driver’s license
suspensions.8
Persons impacted by these suspensions were
disproportionately people of color: in New York City, the driver’s license
suspension rate in the ten zip codes with the highest concentrations of people
of color was two-and-a-half times higher than in the zip codes with the most
concentrated white populations.9 Outside of New York City, the suspension
rate in the ten zip codes with the highest concentrations of people of color
was four times higher than in the ten zip codes with the most concentrated
white populations.10
A 2016 California analysis revealed that ninety-five percent of the
seventy-five zip codes with a percentage of Black residents above twenty
percent had a higher than average license suspension. The analysis further
demonstrated that nearly all of the zip codes with high suspension rates also
had a high proportion of Black residents.11 In San Francisco, specifically,
Black individuals made up forty-eight percent of the drivers whose licenses
were suspended in 2015 but comprised only five percent of San Francisco’s
population.12
Likewise, between 2011 and 2016 in Washington D.C., eighty percent
of all drivers who lost their licenses for nonpayments were Black.13 In 2015
in Virginia, Black people made up just twenty percent of the State’s
population, yet represented nearly half of the drivers who had their licenses
revoked for nonpayments.14 Significant racial disparities for nonpayments
of traffic debt were also documented in Milwaukee, Wisconsin from 2006 to
2011 where Black males experienced seven times more suspensions for
nonpayments than white males and young Black males experienced ten times
more suspensions for nonpayments than young whites.15 In Florida, Black
8. Ted Alcorn, Handcuffed and Arrested for Not Paying a Traffic Ticket, N.Y. TIMES
(May 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/08/nyregion/suspending-licenses-minoroffense-money.html.
9. Weiss & Wilner, supra note 3.
10. Id.
11. BACK ON THE ROAD CAL., Stopped, Fined, Arrested – Racial Bias in Policing and
Traffic Courts in California 6–8 (2016), https://ebclc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
04/Stopped_Fined_Arrested_BOTRCA.pdf.
12. The “Driver’s License Revocation Fairness Amendment Act of 2017” (22-0618):
Hearing Before the Comm. on Transp. and the Env’t, Council Period 22 (D.C. 2018)
(statement of Marques Banks, Equal Justice Works Fellow, Washington Lawyers’ Comm. for
Civil Rights and Urban Affairs).
13. Id.
14. Brief of Amicus Curiae Virginia State Conference of the NAACP Opposing
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Stinnie et al. v. Holcomb, No. 3:16-cv-44, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35789 (W.D. Va. Nov. 3, 2016), available at https://www.justice4all.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/VA-NAACP-Amicus-Brief-Opposing-Motion-to-Dismiss.pdf.
15. John Pawasarat & Lois M. Quinn, Driver’s License Issues and Recommendations 16
(2015), https://dc.uwm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1183&context=eti_pubs.
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people have their driver’s license suspended about one-and-a-half times the
rate they are represented in the general population.16 And these are just a
few examples of the disproportionate impact driver’s license suspensions for
nonpayments have on communities of color.
III. People of Color are Disproportionately at Risk for Driver’s License
Suspensions
More than seven million people have lost their driver’s licenses because
of traffic debt.17 In fact, just five states—Texas, North Carolina, Virginia,
Tennessee, and Michigan—accounted for 4.2 million individuals with
suspensions as of fall 2017.18 In New York, nearly two-thirds of all driver’s
license suspensions were for traffic debt,19 and such suspensions were
drastically compounded for communities of color. In 2017 in Florida, 1.1
million suspension notices were issued because of unpaid court debt.20 As
people of color are disproportionately stopped, ticketed, ticketed with
multiple tickets, arrested, charged, and convicted for traffic violations and
driving with suspended licenses, people of color are disproportionately at
risk for driver’s licenses suspensions.21 Exacerbating the risk are
disproportionate concentrations of poverty among communities of color; as
is self-evident, poverty makes it more difficult to pay traffic debt.

16. Austin Erblat, South Florida Still Has Racial Disparities in Driver’s License
Suspensions, Report Says, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL, (Dec. 3, 2019, 4:21 PM), https://www.sunsentinel.com/community/fl-cn-south-florida-drivers-license-suspensions-20191203-bnbvfjx
3jrba3apjho46l2i6wi-story.html.
17. Justin Wm. Moyer, More Than 7 Million People May Have Lost Driver’s Licenses
Because of Traffic Debt, WASH. POST (May 19, 2018, 1:18 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/local/public-safety/more-than-7-million-people-may-have-lost-drivers-licensesbecause-of-traffic-debt/2018/05/19/97678c08-5785-11e8-b656-a5f8c2a9295d_story.html
(“The total number nationwide could be much higher based on the population of states that
did not or could not provide data.”).
18. Mario Salas & Angela Ciolfi, Driven by Dollars: A State-By-State Analysis of
Driver’s License Suspension Laws for Failure to Pay Court Debt 1 (2017), https://www.
justice4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Driven-by-Dollars.pdf.
19. Alcorn, supra note 8.
20. Carson Whitelemons, Ashley Thomas & Sarah Couture, Driving on Empty:
Florida’s Counterproductive and Costly Driver’s License Suspension Practices 3 (2019),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2019/11/florida-fines-fees-drivers-lice
nse-suspension-driving-on-empty.pdf. Note, the term “court debt” includes unpaid
misdemeanor and felony fines and fees in addition to traffic debt.
21. See, e.g., Siân Mughan & Joanna Carroll, Escaping the Long Arm of the Law? Racial
Disparities in the Effect of Failure-to-Pay License Suspension (2020), https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3631885 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3631885.
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A. Heavier Traffic Enforcement Among Communities of Color
Communities of color are disproportionately policed. Correspondingly,
people of color are disproportionately stopped, ticketed, arrested, charged,
and punished. Therefore, driver’s license suspensions—and the associated
fines, fees, and costs—disproportionately target and harm communities of
color.
Indeed, racial disparities in traffic stops are a pervasive problem,22 and
“are large, ubiquitous across the nation, and troubling.”23 However, the
grave lack of data on traffic stops precludes us from understanding and
analyzing the true extent to which communities of color
disproportionately—and unconstitutionally—are subjected to traffic stops.24
A Department of Justice (DOJ) report revealed that in 2011 Black drivers
were thirty-one percent more likely to be pulled over than white drivers.25
More recently, the Stanford Open Policing Project examined about ninetythree million traffic stops conducted from 2011 to 2017 across twenty-one
state patrol agencies and twenty-nine municipal police departments. The
study concluded that Black drivers are twenty percent more likely to get
pulled over than white drivers.26 It further indicated that among both
municipal police and state patrol stops, Black drivers, on average, are more
likely to be stopped than white drivers.27
22. See infra Appendix 2 for data demonstrating that people of color across the country
are disproportionately stopped by law enforcement agencies.
23. Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Racial Disparities in Traffic Stop Outcomes, 9 DUKE
FORUM FOR LAW & SOC. CHANGE 21, 22 (2017).
24. See infra Appendix 5.
25. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, No. NCJ 242937, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011
(2013); Christopher Ingraham, You Really Can Get Pulled Over for Driving While Black,
Federal Statistics Show, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014, 11:44 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/09/you-really-can-get-pulled-over-for-driving-while-bla
ck-federal-statistics-show/.
26. See Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police
Stops Across the United States, Stanford Computational Policy Lab (2019), https://5harad.
com/papers/100M-stops.pdf; AJ Willingham, Researchers Studied Nearly 100 Million Traffic
Stops and Found Black Motorists are More Likely to Be Pulled Over, CNN (Mar. 21, 2019,
12:54 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/21/us/police-stops-race-stanford-study-trnd/ind
ex.html; Sarah Ruiz-Grossman, Study Finds Racial Bias In Police Traffic Stops And Searches,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 7:00 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/White-Blackdrivers-police- stops-searches-racial-bias_n_5c916558e4b0f7ed945d4ba3; Erik Oritz, Inside
100 Million Police Traffic Stops: New evidence of Racial Bias, NBC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2019,
10:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/inside-100-million-police-trafficstops-new-evidence- racial-bias-n980556.
27. Pierson et al., supra note 26, at 3–4. Though the statistics that informed this
conclusion “do not account for possible race-specific differences in driving behavior,
including amount of time spent on the road and adherence to traffic laws,” the study authors
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The DOJ’s landmark Ferguson Report revealed similarly troubling and
racialized policing practices there. Between October 2012 and October
2014, the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) reported 11,610 traffic stops.
Although Black individuals accounted for only sixty-seven percent of the
population, they accounted for 9,875—eighty-five percent—of those stops.28
Moreover, Missouri’s attorney general released a report demonstrating that
Black drivers across the entire state of Missouri are ninety-one percent more
likely than white drivers to be pulled over by police.29
Undoubtedly, there is a positive correlation between racial disparities
in traffic stops and the disproportionate share of driver’s license suspensions
that people of color endure. That is, racialized policing practices certainly
help drive racially disparate suspension rates.
B. Pretextual Stops Generally Used Against People of Color for
Reasons Wholly Unrelated to Traffic Safety
Pretextual stops are increasingly used for the purpose of generating
fines and fees revenue and have little (if anything) to do with traffic safety.
By way of example, there are 1,246 town and village justice courts in New
York which the State and its subdivisions use to raise millions in revenue,30
so much so that six of New York’s municipalities rank in the top 100
nationally in terms of revenue generated from fines.31 In 2017, New York’s
justice courts collected nearly $250 million in revenues through fines, fees,
and other exactions.32 In Nassau and Suffolk counties, traffic court fines and
fees totaled $146 million in 2017, up about $104 million from five years
employed a statistical approach known as the “veil of darkness test” (i.e., the examination of
stops conducted at times when it would be difficult for an officer to view a motorist’s race
prior to the stop) to mitigate the “benchmarking problem.” Id. at 4. The results after
implementing the technique similarly suggested that racial discrimination against black
drivers informs police officers’ stop decisions. Id. at 4–5.
28. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 64 (2015). The Report acknowledged the limitations to using basic population
data as a benchmark to evaluate traffic stops, but found that the data was sufficiently reliable
because “black drivers might account for less of the driving pool than would be expected from
overall population rates because a lower proportion of blacks than whites is at or above the
minimum driving age.” Id. at 64 n. 39 (emphasis in original).
29. Summer Ballentine, Black Missouri Drivers 91% More Likely to be Stopped, State
Attorney General Finds, PBS (June 10, 2019, 2:11 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
nation/black-missouri-drivers-91-more-likely-to-be-stopped-state-attorney-general-finds.
30. OFFICE OF THE STATE CONTROLLER DIV. OF LOCAL GOV’T AND SCHOOL
ACCOUNTABILITY, Report on Justice Court Fund 1 (2010), https://www.osc.state.ny.us/sites/
default/files/local-government/documents/pdf/2019-02/justicecourtreport2010.pdf.
31. Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black America, PRICEONOMICS (June 24, 2016), https://
priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america.
32. OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, JUSTICE COURT FUND TOWN AND VILLAGE
COURT REVENUE REPORT (2017).
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prior.33 The fifty upstate town and village courts that collected the most fines
for traffic tickets and other violations in 2017 collected a total of $171
million in 2017.34
Although the revenue generated by justice courts are shared between
the State and relevant jurisdiction, the funds allocated to the jurisdiction are
a critical source of funding for town and village government operations,
supporting “budgets for police protection, sanitation, road maintenance and
other key municipal functions.”35 And disturbingly, research shows that
cities, towns, and villages with larger concentrations of people of color fine
residents more on a per capita basis and are more reliant on fines revenue.36
An analysis of data from 9,000 U.S. cities revealed that cities with higher
Black populations are more likely to use fines as a revenue source than cities
with lower Black populations, suggesting that fine revenue-generating
practices unduly target communities of color.37
As an illustration, the Investigative Post of Buffalo reported that
pretextual stops in Buffalo were used to generate revenue and unduly
targeted communities of color. After the City of Buffalo entered into an
arrangement with the State that allowed it to retain most of the money
generated by traffic tickets issued by the Buffalo police—via the creation of
the Buffalo Traffic Violations Agency (BTVA)—the issuance of tickets, and
revenue collected therefrom, soared. Despite the increase in revenue—
which exceeded two million dollars—the City subsequently imposed
thirteen new fees that collectively added at least $100 to virtually all traffic
cases.38 The investigation uncovered that since the BTVA was established,
police write far more tickets for tinted windows—an equipment violation—
33. Craig Schneider, Long Island Finds a Cash Cow: Traffic Tickets, NEWSDAY (Dec. 2,
2018, 7:15 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/traffic-revenue-1.24081944.
34. Michelle Breidenbach, 50 Upstate NY Towns that Collect Most Fines for Speeding,
Traffic Violations, N.Y. UPSTATE, https://www.newyorkupstate.com/news/erry-2018/07
/ab2e7d57 2e1626/50-upstate-ny-towns-that-colle.html (last updated Sept. 27, 2019).
35. THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, Fines and Fees and Jail Time in New York Town
and Village Justice Courts: The Unseen Violation of Constitutional and State Law 2 (Apr. 3,
2019), http://moderncourts.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Fines-and-Fees-and-Jail-Timein-New-York-Town-and-Village-Justice-Courts-The-Unseen-Violation-of-Constitutionaland-State-Law.pdf.
36. See, e.g., Akheil Singla, Charlotte Kirschner & Samuel B. Stone, Race,
Representation, and Revenue: Reliance on Fines and Forfeitures in City Governments, 56
URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW 1132 (2020), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1078
087419834632?journalCode=uarb; Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines, GOVERNING (Sept.
2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-addicted-to-fines.html; Michael
Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government? Descriptive Representation and
Exploitative Revenue Sources (Sept. 12, 2016), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/49a1/4a1ed
2448a788cb11f70c3c4bd91f790c1ca.pdf.
37. Sances & You, supra note 36.
38. Marsha McLeod, City Hall Cashing in on Traffic Tickets, INVESTIGATIVE POST (Feb.
27, 2019), http://www.investigativepost.org/2019/02/27/city-hall-cashing-in-on-traffic-tickets/.
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than for speeding or running red lights and stop signs, moving violations that
involve true driving safety issues.39 In fact, “tinted windows accounted for
17% of the department’s tickets issued, more than any other violation.”40
The investigation also noted that Black and Hispanic or Latinx
neighborhoods were targeted for traffic enforcement. These pretextual stops,
used for revenue generation rather than traffic safety, disproportionately
burdened communities of color.
Further corroborating this disturbing and widespread trend of
government reliance on fines and fees revenue is the DOJ’s investigation,
which found that the City of Ferguson’s focus on revenue generation had
substantial and comprehensive negative impacts and brought similarly
egregious practices in other jurisdictions to light. It concluded that although
the City was “aware for years . . . about the impact its focus on revenue . . .
had on lawful police action and the fair administration of justice,” the City
“disregarded those concerns—even concerns raised from within the City
government—to avoid disturbing the court’s ability to optimize revenue
generation.”41 The DOJ intently criticized the City of Ferguson for
“pressur[ing] officers to write citations, independent of any public safety
need, and rely[ing] on citation productivity to fund the City budget.”42
Notwithstanding patent racial disparities among the people most
impacted by ticket-related fines and fees, and the fact that the use of vehicle
codes for revenue generation have proven to be an inefficient use of law
enforcement resources,43 pretextual stops continue to be employed against
39. Id.
40. Id. This percent appears strikingly high given that tinted windows accounted for less
than 3% of the tickets issued in Rochester, Amherst, and Cheektowaga. Further, half a dozen
motorists reported to the Investigative Post that when cited for tinted windows, they were
given four tickets—one for each window. Id.
41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 28 at 15.
42. Id. at 64.
43. If not used for fines and fees revenue, pretextual stops are typically used for general
investigatory purposes, not to ensure traffic safety. When police officers effectuate traffic
stops as a general law enforcement strategy, the stops “have little (if anything) to do with
traffic safety and everything to do with who looks suspicious.” Baumgartner et al., supra note
23 at 25. Unsurprisingly, racial disparities often ensue from these “investigatory stops,” and
may also bear a strong relation to poverty. Id. Correspondingly, racial disparities in traffic
stops are lower for agencies who conduct traffic stops mainly for reasons of safety, rather than
for reasons such as broken taillights or expired tags—offenses that are generally
disproportionately enforced against people of color. Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp &
Kelsey Shoub, SUSPECT CITIZENS: WHAT 20 MILLION TRAFFIC STOPS TELL US ABOUT
POLICING AND RACE (2018) (demonstrates through a study of twenty million traffic stops in
North Carolina that the use of vehicle code for criminal investigation is extremely inefficient
as it leads to very few contraband hits—throughout the fifteen-year period the study authors
examined, only twelve percent of individuals were arrested after a search incident to a traffic
stop, and explains that racially disparate search practices seem to happen because police tend
to hold unwarranted suspicions about young men of color).
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people of color for reasons that cannot be explained by any legitimate law
enforcement purpose.

IV. People of Color Suffer Disproportionately Harsh Outcomes
Incident to Traffic Stops
A. People of Color Suffer Disproportionately Harsh Outcomes Incident
to Traffic Stops
Not only are people of color more likely to be subjected to traffic stops
by law enforcement, they are more likely to be ticketed and to receive
multiple tickets than white people. Because they are also more likely to
experience poverty than white people, people of color are less likely to be
able to pay traffic-related fines and fees. Accordingly, people of color are
disproportionately at risk for driver’s license suspensions and charges for
driving with a suspended license.44
As an initial matter, because people of color are more likely to be
stopped by law enforcement, they are also more likely to be ticketed and
charged with driving with a suspended license. Once an officer has stopped
an individual, the officer will inevitably run a check on the individual’s
driver’s license. Since people of color disproportionately experience
suspensions for nonpayments, people of color run a disproportionate risk of
being ticketed and charged for driving with a suspended license.
The data analyzed by the Stanford Open Policing Project demonstrate
that police ticket and arrest Black and Hispanic or Latinx drivers more often
than white drivers.45 For instance, the researchers specifically found that
when stopped for speeding, Black drivers are twenty percent more likely,
and Hispanic or Latinx drivers are thirty percent more likely, to get a ticket
(as opposed to a warning) than white drivers.46
Moreover, the DOJ’s investigation of the Ferguson Police Department
(FPD) discovered statistically significant racial disparities in the outcomes
people received after they are subjected to a traffic stop. The investigation
uncovered that while 8,987—or ninety-one percent of—stopped Black
drivers received citations, only 1,501—or eighty-seven percent of—stopped
white drivers received a citation. Similarly, while 891—or ten percent of—
stopped Black drivers were arrested as a result of the stop, only sixty-three—
or four percent of—stopped white drivers were arrested. The investigation
noted that this disparity could largely be explained by the high number of
44. See infra Appendix 3 for additional data confirming that people of color experience
disproportionately harsh outcomes incident to traffic stops.
45. Pierson et al., supra note 26.
46. Id.
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Black individuals “arrested for outstanding municipal warrants issued for
missed court payments and appearances,” which are often the precise
circumstances that give rise to driver’s license suspensions for non-safety
reasons.47 Even after using a regression analysis to control for non-racebased variables, the DOJ investigation concluded that Black individuals in
Ferguson were two times more likely to receive a citation incident to a traffic
stop.48
Additional findings reinforce the DOJ investigation’s conclusion that
Black individuals disproportionately receive unfair and harsh post-traffic
stop outcomes: in 2013, while more than fifty percent of all cited Black
individuals received multiple citations during a single police encounter, only
twenty-six percent of non-Black individuals received more than one citation.
And as the number of citations issued increased beyond two, the racial
disparities grew starker. From October 2012 to July 2014, Black individuals
accounted for eighty-five percent of the 35,871 total charges (traffic
citations, summonses, and arrests) brought by the FPD. Further, the disparity
in speeding tickets between Black individuals and non-Black individuals “is
48% larger when citations are issued not on the basis of radar or laser, but
by some other method, such as the officer’s own visual assessment.” Of the
460 individuals the FPD arrested during a traffic stop solely because the
person had an outstanding warrant, forty-four—or ninety-six percent—of the
individuals were Black.49
B. Disproportionate Concentrations of Poverty Among Communities of
Color
People of color make up a disproportionate share of individuals whose
driver’s licenses are suspended for traffic debt.50 As there is a strong
correlation between poverty and traffic debt suspension rates, this is likely

47. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 28, at 64–66.
48. Id. at 65. This data “is not dependent on population data or on assumption about
differential offending rates by race; instead the enforcement actions imposed against stopped
[B]lack drivers are compared directly to the enforcement actions imposed against stopped
white drivers.” Id. at 64.
49. Id. at 66–67.
50. See, e.g., Salas & Ciolfi, supra note 18, 4–5 (“[R]ecent data from California show a
strong positive correlation by zip code between [B]lack populations and driver’s license
suspension for non- payment or nonappearance at related court hearings. In Virginia, too, data
suggest [B]lack people disproportionately suffer driver’s license suspension for nonpayment.
This group also appears to suffer a disproportionate rate of convictions for driving with a
suspended license when the underlying suspension is due to nonpayment. Similar disparities
have been documented in Wisconsin.”).
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in part attributable to the disproportionately high concentrations of poverty
within communities of color.51
Black individuals are three times as likely, and Hispanic or Latinx
individuals are twice as likely, to experience poverty than white
individuals.52 In 2016, twenty-two percent of Black people lived in poverty
even though Black people represented only about 13.8% of the U.S.
population; by contrast, approximately nine percent of white people lived in
poverty, but represented about seventy-six percent of the U.S. population.53
Further, “Black and Latinx families [are] less likely than white families to
have significant wealth and other assets that can provide a cushion in lean
times, [and] are also disproportionately more likely to be experiencing debt,
another consequence of poverty with long-term and far-reaching effects.”54
Such debt exacerbates financial instability and personal stress and curtails
future employment and housing opportunities through long-term effects on
credit scores and background checks.55
This unfortunate reality suggests that people of color are
disproportionately at risk for driver’s license suspensions issued for traffic
debt.56 It likewise indicates that they are disproportionately less likely to be
able to take off work, find childcare, and/or retain representation to ensure
their appearance in court.57 Moreover, if one is unable to pay a traffic fine,
there is little incentive for them to appear in court, particularly given that
they risk “sitting out” their fine in jail for their inevitable inability to pay the
fine; this accelerates the risk of driver’s license suspension, which of course
51. See, e.g., Weiss & Wilner, supra note 3.
52. SHRIVER CENTER ON POVERTY LAW, https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Let-stalk-about-poverty-and-race.html?soid=1102452077294&aid=AtLAyFKnGvM (last visited
Nov. 25, 2019).
53. Elizabeth Hinton et al., An Unjust Burden: The Disparate Treatment of Black
Americans in the Criminal Justice System, VERA INST. 10 (May 2018), https://www.vera.org/
downloads/publications/for-the-record-unjust-burden-racial-disparities.pdf; U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, QuickFacts, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?d=ACS%205-Year%20Estimates
%20Data%20Profiles&tid=ACSDP5Y2016.DP05 (last visited Sept. 15, 2020).
54. Kathryn Zickuhr, Applying a Racial Equity Lens to Fines and Fees in the District of
Columbia, D.C. POLICY CTR. (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.dcpolicycenter.org/publica
tions/racial-equity-fines-fees/#_ftnref22.
55. Id.
56. Salas & Ciolfi, supra note 18, at 3 (“People in this group have fewer available
resources to divert to paying court debt and are therefore at greater risk of losing their licenses
for nonpayment. While wealthier drivers have little difficulty covering court debt, people
living paycheck-to-paycheck with little or no savings and families to support may not be able
to pay in a lump sum or consistently make payments on installment plans.”).
57. Id., at 3–4 (“People in this group have fewer available resources to divert to paying
court debt, and are therefore at greater risk of losing their licenses for nonpayment. While
wealthier drivers have little difficulty covering court debt, people living paycheck-topaycheck with little or no savings and families to support may not be able to pay in a lump
sum or consistently make payments on installment plans.”).
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entails significant additional and unaffordable financial obligations. Indeed,
throughout New York, for instance, the driver’s license suspension rate in
the ten poorest zip codes is nearly nine times higher than the suspension rate
in the ten wealthiest zip codes.58

V. CONSEQUENCES OF DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS
Laws that permit traffic debt suspensions without requiring
consideration of individuals’ ability to pay have far-reaching ramifications.
Not only do such laws negatively impact the individuals whose licenses are
suspended and their families, they also harm communities, public safety, and
economies. Traffic debt suspensions seriously impede individuals’ ability to
maintain their livelihoods, needlessly expose individuals to the criminal
justice system, perilously divert law enforcement efforts from true public
safety threats, and senselessly hamper the economy at large. Furthermore,
traffic debt suspensions are entirely counterproductive in that they make it
more difficult to collect debt from people who are too impoverished to be
able to pay it. In short, the consequences of driver’s license suspensions are
deleterious for all.
A. Entrenches the Debt Trap
For individuals living below the poverty line, driver’s license
suspension is all but inevitable when faced with traffic fines, fees, and related
costs. A full-time worker earning the federal minimum wage grosses $290
per week, amounting to $15,080 per year. In 2018, 11.8% of people in the
United States—38.1 million people—fell below the poverty line ($25,465 or
less for a family of four in 2018).59 But it is not only people below the
poverty line who struggle to pay traffic-related fines and fees. Given that
forty percent of Americans adults cannot cover an unexpected $400 expense,
a substantial share of the population likely cannot cover an unexpected traffic
ticket and the related expenses.60
By way of illustration, the fines that trigger traffic debt suspensions in
New York can range from fifty dollars to well over $1,000, not including the
58. Weiss & Wilner, supra note 3.
59. CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, NEW YORK OVERALL POVERTY – 2019,
https://talkpoverty.org/basics/#povertyrate (last visited Aug. 29, 2020); See also Jessica
Semega, Melissa Kollar, John Creamer, and Abinash Mohanty, Income and Poverty in the
United States: 2018, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/
2019/demo/p60-266.pdf
60. FEDERAL RESERVE, Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017
2 (May 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2017-report-economicwell-being-us-households-201805.pdf.
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fees and mandatory surcharge that attach.61 And, because multiple tickets
and multiple suspensions can result from one single traffic stop—and
disproportionately do for people of color—many drivers suspended for
FTP/FTA face thousands of dollars of debt that they cannot afford to pay.62
In addition to fines, New York law prescribes a mandatory surcharge that
must be assessed for traffic convictions; for certain traffic convictions, the
surcharge is as high as eighty-eight to ninety-three dollars.63 Further, driver
responsibility assessments are imposed on drivers who accumulate more
than six points on their license within eighteen months; the assessment is
$300 over three years for six points, and an additional seventy-five dollars
for every point in excess of six points, payable over three years.64
Additionally, in some jurisdictions such as Buffalo and Long Island, there
are about $100 in additional fees per traffic ticket.65 Further, if an individual
61. See, e.g., N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1800; N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1809; N.Y. Veh.
& Traf. Law § 1225-c; N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1174.
62. See, e.g., Alcorn, supra note 8 (“Russell Pleasant, a lifelong resident of Staten Island,
is facing a $3,295 judgment stemming from unpaid tickets issued on three occasions in the
mid-1990s that snowballed into [seventeen] license suspensions. Arrested in February, he
was ordered to pay the debt completely or accept a misdemeanor conviction. At age 57, it
would be his first. To earn that amount, Mr. Pleasant would need to work five weeks at the
Ikea warehouse where he is now a forklift operator, a job he said he retrained for this winter
after the house his family was living in burned down.”); Complaint ¶ 7, Black Love Resists
v. City of Buffalo, No. 1:18-cv-00719 (W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018) (“[O]ne class member was
issued four separate tickets for having four tinted windows, costing him $720 ($180 per
window). Furthermore, in an effort to secure additional payment, the issuing officer offered
that class member a choice: jail or the immediate impoundment of his car. The class member
chose impoundment, and thus had to pay an additional $125 fee the next day to retrieve his
vehicle, which he needed for his livelihood.”); Complaint ¶¶ 214–22, Black Love Resists v.
City of Buffalo, No. 1:18-cv-00719 (W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018) (“Defendant Thomas . . .
issued Ms. Doe four tickets: three seat belt violations and a violation for driving on a learner’s
permit. . . . Ms. Doe contested the tickets and eventually had a hearing before . . . the BTVA
[which] sent Ms. Doe a letter finding her guilty of all four violations and assessing eight points
on her driver’s license and $446 in fines. As a result of this incident, Ms. Doe also owed a
Driver Responsibility Assessment in the amount of $450. At the time of hearing, Ms. Doe
was attending school full-time and had no income. Ms. Doe could not afford to pay her tickets
and surcharges in one lump sum. Ms. Doe sought a payment plan from the BTVA. The BTVA
refused to provide a payment plan or accept partial payments. Because she could not have a
payment plan, Ms. Doe could not pay at all. The NYS Department of Motor Vehicles
suspended Ms. Doe’ learner’s permit because she could not pay the tickets and surcharges.”).
63. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1809; Increases in The Cost of Traffic Tickets in New York,
ROSENBLUM LAW (May 6, 2013), https://newyorkspeedingfines.com/increases-cost-traffictickets-york/. The law does cap the surcharge that can be assessed per incident at $196. N.Y.
STATE OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, Accountability for Traffic Ticket Surcharges 5
(Aug. 2015), https://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093015/14s26.pdf.
64. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, HOW TO PAY A DRIVER RESPONSIBILITY
ASSESSMENT, https://dmv.ny.gov/tickets/how-pay-driver-responsibility-assessment (last
visited Dec. 26, 2019).
65. McLeod, supra note 38; Schneider, supra note 33.
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has multiple FTP/FTA suspensions, fees of up to $400 may also be
imposed.66
It is all but obvious that fines, fees, and other costs quickly cascade and
become prohibitively expensive for people who could not afford what very
likely began as a simple traffic ticket. For many people, coming up with
these sums to pay the traffic-related fines, fees, and costs before the payment
deadline is an impossible feat. People are forced to choose between paying
the traffic-related fines, fees, and costs and purchasing basic necessities for
themselves and their families, which really is no choice at all. Thus,
suspensions for nonpayment become inescapable and further entrench
people in an already insurmountable debt trap.
Furthermore, the loss of the ability to drive seriously threatens
individuals’ economic security. Without the ability to legally drive,
individuals are impeded from meeting basic needs of their families—they
are precluded from legally driving to jobs, schools, medical appointments,
places of worship, grocery stores, etc.67 The irony of license-for-payment
schemes is that those who lose their licenses for their inability to pay trafficrelated debt are thrust deeper into poverty due to the financial consequences
flowing from the suspensions of their driver’s licenses. It therefore
perpetuates the already intractable cycle of poverty that too many people
endure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized the
financial consequences that inevitably flow from government attempts to
extract wealth from individuals charged with violations such as those that
underlie suspensions for FTP/FTA:
Raising money for government through law enforcement
whatever the source . . . can lay a debt trap for the poor. When a
minor offense produces a debt, that debt, along with the attendant
court appearances, can lead to loss of employment or shelter,
compounding interest, yet more legal action, and an ever-expanding
financial burden—a cycle as predictable and counterproductive as it
is intractable.68
Indeed, the California Legislature, “[i]n recognition of the
counterproductive nature of [the license-for-payment scheme] and its
tendency to enmesh indigent defendants in a cycle of repeated violations and
escalating debt . . . amended several statutes to prohibit the courts and the

66. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 503(j-1)(i).
67. U.S. COMM’N. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST COMMUNITIES
OF COLOR: CIVIL RIGHTS & CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 35 (Sept. 2017); Salas & Ciolfi,
supra note 18.
68. Rivera v. Orange Cty. Prob. Dep't., 832 F.3d 1103, 1112 n.7 (9th Cir. 2016).
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[DMV] from suspending a driver’s license because of an unpaid traffic
citation.”69
The highest court in the land has likewise recognized that once a
driver’s license is issued, it “become[s] essential [to] the pursuit of a
livelihood.”70 It should therefore be no surprise that there is a strong
correlation between driver’s license suspension and job loss as well as
missed job opportunities.71 For instance, a New Jersey study indicated that
more than forty percent of people lost their jobs after their driver’s licenses
were suspended; nearly half of those people could not find new jobs.72 Of
those able to find new employment, eighty-eighty percent reported a
decrease in pay.73 Similarly, a study conducted in Phoenix, Arizona
demonstrated that 28.3% of individuals lost a job immediately after their
driver’s license was suspended; 52.9% of those whose license was suspended
for more than three months reported losing a job as a direct consequence of
their suspended license. The median annual income loss as a result of license
suspensions was $36,800.74
Driver’s license suspensions thus trap people who are poor in an
impossible predicament. They often cannot work without their driver’s
license because they lose their method of commuting or because their job
requires a valid driver’s license; however, they also cannot afford to pay
what is required to have their license reinstated without steady employment.
The bottom line is that for many people, the suspension of their driver’s
license necessarily results in the deprivation of their livelihood because, in
many instances, it robs people of their right to work for a living.75
69. People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1157, 1164 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019).
70. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
71. U.S. COMM’N. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 67, at 36; Salas & Ciolfi, supra note 18,
at 3; Emily Reina Dindial & Ronald J. Lampard, Opinion, When a Traffic Ticket Costs
$13,000, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/opinion/driverslicense-suspension-fees.html.
72. U.S. COMM’N. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 67, at 36; Henry Grabar, Too Broke to
Drive: States Have Trapped Millions of Americans in Crippling Debt by Taking Away Their
Driver’s Licenses. Can the Damage be Undone?, SLATE (Sept. 27, 2017), https://slate.com/
business/2017/09/state-lawmakers-have-trapped-millions-of-americans-in-debt-by-takingtheir-licenses.html; Joshua Aiken, Reinstating Common Sense: How Driver’s License
Suspensions for Drug Offenses Unrelated to Driving Are Falling out of Favor, PRISON POLICY
INITIATIVE (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/driving/national.html.
73. Aiken, supra note 72.
74. L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN RESEARCH INST., ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY, The City of
Phoenix Municipal Court’s Compliance Assistance Program, 2016: An Economic Assessment
(June 2, 2017), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/74/TFFAIR/Resources/SeidmanResearc
hInstituteReport2017.pdf.
75. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (pursuit of an occupation or
profession is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474, 492 (1959) (“the right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen
profession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the ‘liberty’ and

DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS FOR NONPAYMENTS

90

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Vol. 48:1

As a practical matter, most individuals rely on driver’s licenses to travel
to work and maintain employment.76 “[A] license is often needed for
commuting, particularly as jobs are increasingly located outside of inner-city
areas.”77 Although public transportation may be a commuting solution for
some, for those working or living outside of major metropolitan areas, public
transportation is generally not a viable option and people are critically
dependent upon their ability to drive to maintain their jobs. Even if
commuting via public transit is a theoretical option for those living in
metropolitan areas, there are often numerous obstacles, such as the
substantial additional time it takes to get to work using public transit78 as
well as the “long headways, limited service hours, costs, difficulty using
transit to make multiple stops on the way to or from work[,] and safety issues
particularly after dark,”79 that those commuting by public transit face.
Further, a driver’s license “is a very common requirement for the sorts
of job that can actually lift people out of poverty—those in construction,
manufacturing, security, and union jobs including electricians and plumbers
[as well as jobs in home health care, motor vehicle sales and services, and
delivery services].”80 In addition, “[m]any jobs require driving as part of the
work responsibilities; and even for non-driving jobs, employers often require
applicants to have a valid driver’s license as an indicator of reliability or
responsibility.”81 Indeed, the U.S. Department of Labor reported that thirty
percent of civilian jobs required some driving in 2016.82 The result is that
‘property’ concepts of [Due Process]”); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (“the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the
personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to
secure”).
76. Danielle Conley & Ariel Levinson-Waldman, Discriminatory Driver’s License
Suspension Schemes, ACS LAW (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/issue_brief/briefslanding/discriminatory-drivers-license-suspension-schemes/#_ednref42.
77. Alex Bender, et al., Not Just a Ferguson Problem: How Traffic Courts Drive
Inequality in California, LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY
AREA 17 (2015), http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/Not-Just-a-Ferguson-ProblemHow-Traffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality-in-California-4.8.15.pdf.
78. See Mike Maciag, Riding Transit Takes Almost Twice as Long as Driving,
GOVERNING (Feb. 2017), https://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastruc
ture/gov-transit-driving-times.html.
79. Evelyn Blumenberg & Daniel Baldwin Hess, Measuring the Role of Transportation
in Facilitating the Welfare-to-Work Transition: Evidence from Three California Counties,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA TRANSPORTATION CENTER (2002), https://escholarship.
org/uc/item/2ww4c93w.
80. Alana Semuels, No Driver’s License, No Job, THE ATLANTIC (June 15, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/no-drivers-license-no-job/486653/;
Bender, supra note 77 at 17–18.
81. Bender, supra note 77, at 17.
82. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 30 Percent of Civilian Jobs
Require Some Driving in 2016, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS: THE ECONOMICS DAILY BLOG
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for people with a suspended driver’s license, the pool of job opportunities is
limited. These limited job prospects, in turn, make the debt trap, and poverty,
even more difficult to escape.
In sum, driver’s license suspensions further entrench the debt trap by
impeding employment opportunities.
They foreclose people from
employment because a license is often needed for transportation to and from
work and is increasingly required for certain jobs, even jobs for which
driving is not a job function. As people of color disproportionately suffer
from driver’s license suspensions, they correspondingly and
disproportionately face an additional barrier to the job market—the lack of a
driver’s license. As a result of this employment barrier, the individual now
has a decreased ability to pay what is required to get their license reinstated.
This serves only to further compound the debt trap.
B. Bloats the Criminal Justice System
Of equal concern, traffic debt suspensions needlessly expand the scope
of the criminal justice system, inducting staggering numbers of individuals
into the criminal justice system on the basis of race and poverty and fueling
mass incarceration.
Since the ability to drive is crucial to individuals’ daily lives and their
livelihoods, about seventy-five percent of individuals with suspended
licenses continue to drive.83 If they are caught, they are arrested—
establishing a means by which individuals are thrust into the criminal justice
system because of their inability to pay. In addition to making important life
responsibilities much tougher (and even impossible) to go about, traffic debt
suspensions paradoxically make it increasingly difficult for individuals to
meet subsequent court obligations.84 This can result in added FTA charges
for individuals who, in part as a result of their suspension, lack the resources
and/or transportation to make court appearances. Thus, many individuals
continue to drive, even though they run the risk of being stopped, ticketed,
arrested, and charged for driving with a suspended license because their
survival depends on it.

(June 27, 2017) https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/30-percent-of-civilian-jobs-requiresome-driving-in-2016.htm.
83. AM. ASS’N. OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, Best Practices Guide to Reducing
Suspended Drivers 4 (Feb. 2013), https:// www.aamva.org/Suspended-and-Revoked-DriversWorking-Group/.
84. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 28 at 50.
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More than seven million Americans have had their driver’s license
suspended for traffic debt.85 Between January 2016 and April 2018, New
York issued nearly 1.7 million driver’s license suspensions for Traffic
Debt.86 (This article will use New York as an example to explain how
license-for-payment laws bloat the criminal justice system.) As so many
suspended drivers have no choice but to continue driving to meet their
families’ basic needs, it follows that driving with a suspended license is one
of the most common criminal charges in New York and around the country:87






According to DMV data, New York issued more than 108,000
tickets for driving with a suspended license in 2018. Suffolk County
issued the most tickets for driving with a suspended license in 2018,
handing out nearly 21,000 tickets. Nassau County issued the next
most tickets, totaling almost 8,500, with Erie County and Onondaga
County following next, issuing 7,310 tickets and 6,320 tickets,
respectively.88
Between 2014 and 2017 in Erie County, police charged a staggering
33,000 individuals with driving with a suspended license—in
Buffalo alone, more than 14,000 individuals were charged with
driving with a suspended license. Between January 2014 and
October 2018, “more than 900 drivers charged with these offenses
were shipped to the Erie County Holding Center . . . presumably
after being unable to post bail.” Of these 900 individuals, nearly
75% were Black, though Black individuals make up just thirty-seven
percent of Buffalo’s population.89
In New York City, where substantially fewer people drive than in
most places, the fourth most charged crime in 2018 was driving with
a suspended license. Eighty percent of those arrested for driving
with a suspended license in New York City are Black or Hispanic or
Latinx.90

85. Moyer, supra note 17. (“The total number nationwide could be much higher based
on the population of states that did not or could not provide data.”).
86. Weiss & Wilner, supra note 3.
87. See infra Appendix 4 for additional data on jurisdictions outside of New York.
88. DMV data obtained by Rosenblum Law and on file with the author. For additional
historical data and analysis, see Adam Rosenblum, Driving with a Suspended Driver’s
License in New York, ROSENBLUM LAW, https://traffictickets.com/new-york/criminalcharges/driving-with-a-suspended-license (last updated Aug. 9, 2019).
89. Marsha McLeod, Suspended Driver’s Licenses Snare New York’s Poorest Citizens,
THE CRIME REPORT (May 23, 2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/05/23/535223.
90. N.Y. CITY COUNCIL FIX THE SYSTEM, New York City Council Speaker Corey Johnson
is Committed to Criminal Justice Reform, https://council.nyc.gov/data/fix-the-system/ (last
visited Dec. 23, 2019).
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If an individual is caught driving with a suspended license, which
people of color disproportionately are, they are charged with aggravated
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (AUO), which entails an onslaught
of even more additional fines, fees, surcharges, and costs as well as possible
imprisonment.91
For AUO in the third degree, the charge for a first offense, New York
law assesses a fine between $200–$500, or imposes up to thirty days’
imprisonment; it also allows for both the fine and imprisonment.92 For AUO
in the second degree, which a person is charged with if they committed an
AUO in the preceding eighteen months or have three or more FTP/FTA
suspensions,93 New York law assesses a fine of at least $500 and also
requires a term of imprisonment or probation.94 Because AUO in the third
and second degree are misdemeanors, a mandatory $175 surcharge and $25
crime victim assistance fee are also assessed—the court has no discretion to
waive the surcharges or fees.95 For AUO in the first degree, the charge if a
person commits an AUO in the third degree and has ten or more FTP/FTA
suspensions,96 New York law assesses a fine between $500–$5,000 and
requires a term of imprisonment or probation.97 This is a felony and so a
$300 mandatory surcharge and $25 crime victim assistance fee are also
assessed.98
Not only do AUO charges related to FTP/FTA suspensions needlessly
incarcerate people for their poverty, they also serve to entrench the debt trap,
91. When people are arrested for driving with a suspended license, they are often
handcuffed for hours, and once detained may wait as long as forty-eight hours—the [federal]
constitutional limit—to be seen by a judge. BACK ON THE ROAD CAL., supra note 11, at 28.
However, sometimes, “administrative or bureaucratic errors can undermine the timeliness by
which an arrestee avails himself of this fundamental constitutional right.” Id. These police
detentions have negative psychological impacts on individuals that can last long beyond the
arrest and detention. Further, as arrests are unplanned, they pull people from their daily
responsibilities and therefore cause people to miss work, lose their jobs, go without needed
medical treatment or care, and also render them unable to tend to their children. Even once a
person is released from detainment, they are then compelled “to navigate a confusing and
complex court process, pay attorney’s fees and court fees, and decide whether to plead guilty
to a misdemeanor offense of driving with a suspended license, which comes with a litany of
additional penalties.” Id. at 29.
92. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(1)(b).
93. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(2)(a)(i), (iv).
94. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(2)(b). If a person is charged with AUO in the second
degree for committing an AUO in the preceding eighteen months, a term of imprisonment
must be imposed, and it must not exceed 180 days. If a person is charged with AUO in the
second degree because they have three or more FTP/FTA suspensions, the term of
imprisonment must be at least seven days, but is also capped at 180 days. Id.
95. N.Y. Penal Law § 60.35(1)(a)(ii); People v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 730 (2016).
96. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(3)(a)(ii).
97. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(3)(b).
98. N.Y. Penal Law § 60.35(1)(a)(i).
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as discussed above. The fines, fees, and surcharges are then compounded by
the higher insurance premiums99 one will have to pay if they are found guilty
of driving with a suspended license.100
In short, suspensions for non-driving safety reasons needlessly lead to
AUO pleas and convictions that generate criminal records that most
individuals would not have otherwise. By virtue of AUOs producing a
criminal record, traffic debt suspensions serve to foreclose even more
employment opportunities, further exacerbating the financial impact of a
driver’s license suspension. Traffic debt suspensions essentially create a
“gateway to jail, probation, additional fines, and a criminal record for some
of [New York’s] most vulnerable.”101
C. Endangers Public Safety
When driver’s licenses are suspended for non-safety reasons, such as
traffic debt suspensions, public safety is at risk. Such suspensions reduce the
number of insured drivers on the road and divert significant public safety
resources.
Traffic debt suspensions unnecessarily increase the number of
unlicensed and uninsured drivers on the road, thereby jeopardizing public
safety. This is the case because people convicted of driving with a suspended
license often lose their insurance coverage, but still must drive to get to work
and medical appointments, drop their kids off at school, and make their court
dates. Furthermore, for reinstated drivers, insurance premiums often become
cost prohibitive as they are higher for previously suspended drivers,
regardless of the underlying reason for the suspension (as driving records do
not always distinguish between suspensions due to unsafe driving behaviors
and other reasons).102
Traffic debt suspensions also divert already limited law enforcement,103
DMV, and court resources from drivers that pose a true threat to public
99. On average, insurance premiums increase by over sixty-seven percent for those
convicted of driving with a suspended license. THE ZEBRA, 2020 State of Auto Insurance 23
(2020), https://www.thezebra.com/state-of-insurance/auto/2020/reports/The-Zebra-State-ofAuto-Insurance-Report-2020.pdf.
100. BACK ON THE ROAD CAL., supra note 11, at 29.
101. Id.
102. Aiken, supra note 72.
103. “As a former police officer, I understand the time and resources that are needed to
stop, arrest, charge, book, and even incarcerate a person for driving on a suspended license.
This waste of time and resources is avoidable. By disallowing drivers’ license suspensions
due to debt, a law enforcement officer’s time can be better focused on enhancing public
safety.” Arthur Rizer, Letter to New York Governor Cuomo on Assembly Bill A7463B, R
STREET INST., https://www.rstreet.org/2020/08/06/letter-to-new-york-governor-cuomo-onassembly-bill-a7463b/#_ftnref1 (last visited Aug. 6, 2020).
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safety.104 The only logical reason to suspend an individual’s driver’s license
is if that individual poses a threat to public safety—i.e., if they are a
dangerous driver. In fact, driver’s license suspensions were first instituted
for the purposes of removing dangerous drivers from the road, changing
risky driving behaviors, and punishing unsafe drivers.105 Though social
nonconformance related suspensions106 were later introduced in an effort “to
change non-highway safety related” behaviors, “no empirical evidence . . .
indicates that suspending a person’s driving privilege for social
nonconformance reasons is effective in gaining compliance with the reason
for the original non-driving suspension.”107 According to the American
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, these social nonconformance
related suspensions are ineffective and counterproductive: they have
“dramatically increased the number of suspended drivers on our roads” and
created “a tremendous burden on law enforcement, DMVs, the courts, and
local communities.”108
Traffic debt suspensions are not for dangerous driving; they are for
nonpayments and nonappearances. Given that drivers suspended for nonsafety reasons represent a substantial share of all suspended drivers and that
“most drivers with suspended licenses pose no more of a threat to public
safety than validly licensed drivers,”109 this misallocation of resources is the
true public safety threat with which we should be concerned.110 This is
particularly so in jurisdictions where most driver’s license suspensions are
issued for FTP/FTA—reasons wholly unrelated to driver dangerousness.111
Indeed, when an already overburdened police force must use
finite resources and expend significant staff hours to pull over,
transport, often jail, and attend court dates with safe drivers who
have been driving with a suspended license, it decreases public
safety. Judges, defense lawyers and prosecutors are placed in a
104. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 67 at 36–38.
105. AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, supra note 83 at 4.
106. “Examples of social non-conformance violations include fuel piracy/theft, failure to
pay taxes, minor in possession of alcohol, false public alarm, illegal solid waste burning,
vandalism, failure to pay alimony, selling alcohol to a minor, truancy, unlawful possession of
firearms, prostitution, and many more.” Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Brief for Fines and Fees Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 4, Kansas v. Glover, 139 S. Ct. 1445, 203 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2019) (No. 18-1556),
2019 WL 4302286.
110. “Law enforcement, the courts and the DMVs could better focus on drivers arrested
for impaired driving, aggressive driving, serious traffic violations, and other risky behavior if
they were not required to take action against individuals suspended for social nonconformance
related offenses.” AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, supra note 83 at 8.
111. Alcorn, supra note 8.
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similar situation. The time they spend dealing with otherwise safe
drivers inevitably eats into time that could be spent monitoring the
roads for reckless drivers and punishing those who could do the
public serious harm.112
Law enforcement agencies expend millions of dollars and personnel
hours each year to administer suspensions issued for reasons unrelated to
driving.113 Furthermore, the financial and personnel costs to DMVs are also
substantial and cause them to “operate outside their core mission of ensuring
highway safety.”114 Courts are likewise already overburdened with more
cases for the number of judges available; the addition of cases for driving
while suspended as a result of a non-safety violation simply compounds that
burden.115 Similarly, non-safety suspension cases take up a substantial
amount of public defenders’ time. For instance, in 2017, low-level
suspension cases made up about fifteen percent of the Legal Aid Bureau of
Buffalo’s total caseload.116
These costs incurred by law enforcement, DMVs, judges, and lawyers
are without any benefits. Drivers whose license are suspended for unpaid
debt are not unsafe drivers, and non-driving safety related suspensions have
proven to be ineffective in achieving their purposes. In brief, “[t]he costs of
arresting, processing, administering, and enforcing social nonconformance
related driver’s license suspensions create a significant strain on budgets and
other resources and detract from highway and public safety priorities.”117
Traffic debt suspensions therefore imprudently divert law enforcement to
handle issues involving poverty, rather than focusing on true safety issues
such as dangerous driving and serious crime.
D. Harms the Economy
Not only do driver’s license suspensions threaten individual financial
stability, they also have ramifications for the economy at large. Job losses
flowing from driver’s license suspensions have a profoundly negative impact
on both GDP and tax revenue. And as driver’s license suspensions are an
ineffective collections tactic, they more than likely do nothing to offset these

112. Ewan Watt, Common Sense on Crime and Driver’s Licenses: Column, USA TODAY
(Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/03/02/dont-suspend-driverslicenses-for-no-good-reason-column/98481984.
113. AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, supra note 83 at 14.
114. Id. at 16–22.
115. Id. at 14.
116. McLeod, supra note 38.
117. AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, supra note 83 at 2.
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negative impacts.
Furthermore, driver’s license suspensions harm
employers, which in turn also contributes to decreased GDP and tax revenue.
A study of a driver’s license reinstatement program in Phoenix, Arizona
found that the median annual income loss as a result of driver’s license
suspensions was $36,800. This resulted in decreased GDP and tax revenue
as there are positive correlations between low unemployment and GDP and
tax revenue. To this end, the study further found that after the driver’s
licenses of the 7,000 program participants were reinstated, they collectively
gained 1,904 job years of employment118 and $87 million dollars in labor
income, which, due to individuals’ reinstated ability to earn and spend
money, resulted in a $149.6 million increase in GDP. Likewise, the $87
million dollars in labor income positively impacted state income tax revenue
given the positive correlation between low unemployment rates and tax
revenue.119
Moreover, driver’s license suspensions are an ineffective collections
tactic and therefore do nothing to benefit the government’s fiscal coffers or
offset the economic harm of traffic debt suspensions. Because people who
do not have the money to pay simply cannot pay it, nearly half of suspensions
issued in 2016 in New York remained in effect one year later.120 Similarly,
an examination of four counties in Florida—in which there almost 2 million
drivers with suspended licenses statewide—demonstrated that, on average,
77.12% of driver’s license suspensions remained in effect after a two year
period.121 By way of further example, Tulsa County state courts have levied
$209.3 million in fines and court costs on individuals for traffic,
misdemeanor, and felony cases since 2008. Yet, as of mid-2019, $157.8
million—about three-quarters of the original amount levied—is still owed.
It is hardly a coincidence that residents living in the zip codes that owe the
most in court fines and fees are comprised of some of the poorest residents
in their respective counties and are largely communities of color.122
Employers are also harmed when driver’s licenses are suspended
because they are forced to “hire and train new workers every time an

118. One job year is defined as the employment of one person for twelve consecutive
months. L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN RESEARCH INST., supra note 74 at 5 n.3.
119. L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN RESEARCH INST., supra note 74.
120. Weiss & Wilner, supra note 3.
121. Whitelemons et al., supra note 20.
122. Curtis Killman & Tim Stanley, Unpaid Court Fees Disproportionately Impact North
Tulsa Leaving Residents ’Entrapped’ in Debt, Analysis Shows, TULSA WORLD (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/specialreports-databases/unpaid-court-feesdisproportionately-impacts-north-tulsa-leaving-residents-entrapped/article_fa02e372-25ef512e-829f-742f12979e7d.html.
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employee is fired because he or she is unable to drive to work.”123 Hiring
and re-training a new person for a job that was being performed well by
someone else entails a cost in and of itself.124 Losing a qualified, productive
employee results in a financial loss to the employer as the resources and
training the employer invested in the employee become a sunk cost if the
employee is no longer able to perform job duties due to their driver’s license
suspension. Moreover, non-safety suspensions unnecessarily diminish the
available labor force, making certain jobs unnecessarily difficult for
employers to fill. For example, a driver’s license is often a prerequisite for
employment in industries such as construction, home health care, motor
vehicle sales and services, and delivery services.125 As a consequence of
traffic debt suspensions, these industries suffer in terms of productivity for
they cannot fill open positions due to the needlessly narrowed labor pool, as
do the governments that benefit from taxable revenue and the constituents
these industries serve.
In sum, traffic debt suspensions strike a hard and wide-reaching
economic blow to the economy, governments, and employers alike.

VI. LICENSE-FOR-PAYMENT LAWS ARE
VULNERABLE TO LEGAL CHALLENGES
As recent litigation and legislation126 appear to have recognized,
license-for-payment laws are legally flawed. They are problematic on
several constitutional grounds, and in fact, the intersectionality of the
constitutional violations underscores the illegality of the policy. Further, the
disparate impact that license-for-payment laws have on communities of color
likely renders them in violation of regulations that condition significant
federal funding on compliance.
This article examines each legal
vulnerability in turn.
A. Fourteenth Amendment
License-for-payment laws punish individuals for traffic debt—in other
words, they punish people for poverty. They also disproportionately impact
people of color. Such practices present serious constitutional issues.
123. Harmann Singh, Challenging Unconstitutional Driver’s License Suspensions, U. OF
PENN. CAREY L. SCH. (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/7910-challe
nging-unconstitutional-drivers-license.
124. Bender, supra note 77, at 18.
125. Bender, supra note 77, at 17–18.
126. For example, between 2017–2019, California, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Texas,
Virginia, and Washington D.C. enacted legislative reforms to end debt-based driver’s license
suspensions.

DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS FOR NONPAYMENTS

Fall 2020

DRIVERS LICENSE SUSPENSIONS FOR NONPAYMENTS

99

i. Fundamental Fairness
“All people . . . must, so far as the law is concerned, stand on an equality
before the bar of justice. . . .”127 Indeed, punishing a person “simply because
he could not pay [a] fine, without considering the reasons for the inability to
pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or extending the time for payments
or making alternative orders,” is “little more than punishing a person for his
poverty.”128 In a long line of cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has
evaluated the impact of money in the justice system, it has eschewed the
application of the traditional due process and equal protection tiered
approach, and has instead adopted the more nuanced doctrine of fundamental
fairness—a convergence of due process and equal protection principles.129
The Court’s fundamental fairness doctrine does not tolerate laws that
punish people for their inability to pay.130 When considering economic
disparities in the justice system, the Court’s fundamental fairness approach
requires an inquiry into: (1) the nature of the individual interest affected and
the extent to which it is affected; (2) the rationality of the connection between
legislative means and purpose; and (3) the existence of alternative means for
effectuating the purpose.131 This article analyzes these considerations, as
applied driver’s license suspension schemes, in turn.
First, driver’s licenses are a property right protected by the U.S.
Constitution.132 Further, “driving an automobile [is] a virtual necessity for
most Americans,”133 and thus the nature of an individual’s interest in their
127. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956). The principles from Griffin and its
progeny extend beyond instances in which a defendant is subject to imprisonment. M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 111 (1996).
128. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671, 674 (1983). Indeed, unpaid fines and fees
often result in civil judgments, which entail significant human and financial consequences for
those who cannot pay because of their poverty and therefore blamelessly fail to pay the
judgments. People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1157, 1167–68 (Ct. App. 2019), review denied
(Mar. 27, 2019). The consequences of driver’s license suspensions are analogous to, and as
serious and punitive as, the consequences that flow from civil judgments. Therefore, traffic
debt suspensions should be analyzed within the same framework as unpaid fines and fees that
result in civil judgments.
129. See, e.g., M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 102; Bearden, 461 U.S. at 660; Griffin, 351 U.S. at 12;
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259–266 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
130. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67, 670–71; Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th at 1164.
131. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67 (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 260 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
132. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (“Suspension of issued licenses thus
involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the
licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”) The Court also recognized that the continued possession of a
driver’s license can be “essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.” Id. at 539.
133. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
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driver’s license and the extent to which the interest is affected could not be
more sweeping. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that “the right to work
for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity which it was the purpose of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.”134 The ability to drive is essential
for many people to go about their lives and earn a living. When one’s license
is suspended for FTP/FTA, the individual is outright prohibited from driving
and is therefore precluded from going about their daily activities and
obligations, particularly if they reside in an area with limited public
transportation options. Moreover, a choice between paying a fine which one
cannot afford to pay and having one’s driver license—which is integral to go
about one’s life and earning a livelihood—suspended is really no choice at
all.135 As one court has explained:
[T]he ability to drive is crucial to the debtor’s ability to actually
establish the economic self-sufficiency that is necessary to be able
to pay the relevant obligations. . . . [O]ne needs only to observe the
details of ordinary life to understand that an individual who cannot
drive is at an extraordinary disadvantage in both earning and
maintaining material resources. Suspending a driver’s license is
therefore not merely out of proportion to the underlying purpose of
ensuring payment, but affirmatively destructive of that end.136
Considering that license-for-payment laws can completely deprive
people of the judicially recognized vital property interest in their driver’s
licenses, the nature of the interest and the extent to which it is affected
indicate that the law should be held to be fundamentally unfair.
Second, license-for-payment laws are wholly irrational. A state might
argue two grounds for rationality—that the law enables it to collect
outstanding debt and helps it to ensure the safety of roads—neither of which
would hold up in a rationality analysis.
134. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). See also Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286,
291–92 (1999).
135. The “choice” of paying $100 fine or spending 30 days in jail is really no choice at all
to the person who cannot raise $100. The resulting imprisonment is no more or no less than
imprisonment for being poor. To put it in another way and in the context of the present case,
when a fine in the same amount is imposed upon codefendants deemed equally culpable with
the added provision for their imprisonment in the event of its nonpayment, an option is given
to the rich defendant but denied to the poor one. While the poor man has the “right” to obtain
his release by payment of the fine, in actuality the “right” is meaningless to him. In re Antazo,
3 Cal. 3d 100, 108 (1970). This case was approvingly cited by the Bearden Court. Bearden,
461 U.S. at 664–69 n.6, n.10.
136. Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-CV-1263, 2017 WL 4418134, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Oct.
5, 2017).
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By way of illustration, the fact that nearly half of the traffic debt
suspensions issued in New York in 2016 remained in effect one year later137
compels the conclusion that it is impossible and irrational, to expect that
suspending someone’s driver’s license will coerce one who cannot afford to
pay to do so.138 Across the nation, there are at least 7 million driver’s license
suspensions for unpaid traffic debt.139 Save for a sudden and unlikely change
in financial circumstances, the draconian threat of driver’s license
suspension does not suddenly give someone who lacks the ability to pay the
ability to pay.140 What the Court said in Bearden with respect to revoking
the probation of indigent defendants is highly applicable here.141 While
punishment, such as imprisonment or driver’s license suspension
may indeed spur [individuals] to try hard to pay, . . . [s]uch a
goal is fully served . . . by [suspending a license] only for persons
who have not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. [Suspending
the driver’s license] of someone who through no fault of his own is
unable to make [payments] will not make [payments] suddenly
forthcoming. Indeed, such a policy may have the perverse effect
of inducing the [individual] to use illegal means [such as driving
with a suspended license] to acquire funds to pay in order to avoid
[permanent suspension].142
Rather than facilitating the collection of outstanding debt, license-forpayment schemes effectively leave impoverished individuals—who are
disproportionately people of color—with no choice but to continue driving
despite the suspension of their license. These individuals risk getting
arrested, charged, and convicted for driving with a suspended license. This
is counterproductive in that it results in the accumulation of more unpayable
and uncollectable outstanding traffic-related debt, as well as criminal justice
debt. As one court put it, “taking an individual’s driver’s license away to try
to make her more likely to pay a fine is not using a shotgun to do the job of
a rifle: it is using a shotgun to treat a broken arm. There is no rational basis
137. Weiss & Wilner, supra note 2.
138. Suspending a driver’s license is “affirmatively destructive” to the purpose of
ensuring payment. Robinson, 2017 WL 4418134, at *9; People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th
1157, 1164 (Ct. App. 2019), review denied (Mar. 27, 2019) (“The laws, moreover, are
irrational: they raise no money because people who cannot pay do not pay.”).
139. Moyer, supra note 16. (“The total number nationwide could be much higher based
on the population of states that did not or could not provide data.”).
140. See, e.g., Robinson, 2017 WL 4418134, at *8 (“No person, however, can be
threatened or coerced into doing the impossible, and no person can be threatened or coerced
into paying money that she does not have and cannot get.”).
141. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670–71 (1983).
142. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670–71 (1983).
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for that.”143 Although collecting outstanding debt may very well be a
legitimate state purpose, a law that is so plainly counterproductive to
achieving said purpose is not rational.144
Further, laws authorizing traffic debt suspensions are not rationally
related to any legitimate state interest in ensuring the safety of roadways.
For such laws to be rationally related to a state interest, the “underlying laws
would have to draw some distinction based on actual expectation of safety
risk, such as, for example, a distinction based on the severity or
numerousness of the underlying offenses.”145 License-for-payment schemes
authorize suspensions for nonpayments of traffic tickets and nonappearances
in traffic court—reasons that have absolutely no correlation with driver
dangerousness.146 There is zero evidence to suggest that drivers who cannot
pay traffic tickets and related costs pose any more of a risk to drivers around
them than drivers who can afford to pay such tickets and related costs.147 In
fact, if such a law’s purpose is to ensure the safety of roadways, the law
actually frustrates its own purpose. It makes roadways less safe insofar as it
inevitably increases the number of unlicensed and uninsured drivers on the
road, and also makes it much more difficult for drivers who have their license
reinstated to procure insurance.
The laws’ lack of a rational relation to states’ interests in collecting
outstanding debt and ensuring the safety of roadways counsels that licensefor-payment laws should be found fundamentally unfair.
Third, several alternative—and more effective—means exist to
effectuate the purpose of collecting outstanding debt. However, many states’
current statutory frameworks are devoid of options that might make it
feasible for low-income individuals to pay the fines and fees imposed upon
them.
Only if alternate measures are not adequate to meet the State's
interests . . . may the court [punish an indigent individual] who has
143. Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-CV-1263, 2017 WL 4418134, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Oct.
5, 2017).
144. “When a plaintiff’s evidence proves that a statute makes worse the very interest it
purports to serve, as well as any other legitimate state interest, the statute is arbitrary,
unreasonable, irrational, and unconstitutional.” Tiwari v. Friedlander, No. 3:19-CV-884JRW-CHL at *12 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2020).
145. Robinson, 2017 WL 4418134, at *8.
146. See, e.g., Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 158 Wn. 2d 208, 231 (Wash. 2006) (Sanders,
J., dissenting) (stating that “revocation of a driver's license for a reason completely unrelated
to the only legitimate police power justification [(to promote highway safety)] for the license
in the first place violates due process” and “the legitimate end of licensing drivers to promote
highway safety does not justify the means of revoking a driver's license to deter delinquency
in child support”).
147. See, e.g., Sian Mughan & Joanna Carroll, supra note 21.
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made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would
deprive the [individual] of his . . . freedom simply because, through
no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation
would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the
Fourteenth Amendment.148
Laws could allow for reduced, waived, or deferred payments for traffic
tickets, for instance. Similarly, laws could allow for partial payments,
payment plans, community service, or other alternatives. These options are
much more likely to result in payment than driver’s license suspensions,
especially because such alternatives do not necessarily result in the
additional financial impediments that suspensions entail.
The existence of ample means for states to effectuate this purpose
further confirms that license-for-payment schemes should be held to be
fundamentally unfair.
Moreover, many courts have recognized the importance of the
fundamental fairness doctrine, and have applied it robustly to avoid
punishing people for their poverty.149 Indeed, New York’s highest court has
held that a judge’s failure to conduct an ability to pay analysis prior to issuing
an arrest warrant for an unpaid speeding ticket violates the Supreme Court’s
holding in Bearden.150 Similarly premised on Bearden, a New York trial
court recently found that “when imposing bail the court must consider the
defendant's ability to pay and whether there [are] any less restrictive means
to achieve the State's interest.”151
For these reasons, it can hardly be considered just, let alone
constitutional, that laws permit indefinite driver’s license suspensions as
punishment for “the crime of being poor.” The infliction of punishment on
individuals solely because of their poverty is not tolerated by the courts.152
As this is precisely what license-for-payment schemes do, they should be
found fundamentally unfair.

148, Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672–73 (1983).
149. For instance, in January 2019, a California appellate court held that imposing fines
and fees “upon indigent defendants without a determination that they have the present ability
to pay . . . [is] fundamentally unfair.” People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1157, 1169 (Ct.
App. 2019), review denied (Mar. 27, 2019).
150. In re Hamel, 88 N.Y.2d 317, 320 (1996). See also In re Hammermaster, 139 Wash.
2d 211, 234 (1999) (noting that “[a] judge’s primary function is the administration of justice,
not the collection of fines,” and a judge’s failure to ascertain the defendants’ ability to pay
demonstrated that “the judge exceeded his role as judge”).
151. People ex rel. Desgranges On Behalf of Kunkeli v. Anderson, 59 Misc. 3d 238, 243
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
152. See, e.g., Bearden, 461 U.S. 660.
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ii. Equal Protection
In lieu of the fundamental fairness doctrine, some courts have instead
employed a more traditional equal protection analysis to evaluate economic
disparities in the justice system. If a court were to analyze a license-forpayment law using the tiered equal protection approach, the law would also
likely be found unconstitutional.153
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands
that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”154 License-for-payment laws could be found to
violate the Equal Protection Clause for at least two reasons. First, a court
could find that there is a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than
race, of a disproportionate impact on people of color, giving rise to a strict
scrutiny analysis. Second, a court could find that the law treats people who
are willing but unable to pay more harshly than people who are willing and
able to pay, when the only difference between such people is their poverty,
giving rise to a rational basis review analysis.155
1. Strict Scrutiny
While intent is generally required for a cognizable equal protection
claim, “discriminatory purpose may be proven through statistics alone”156
where a “clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges
from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation

153. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 449–50 (1985)
(while a city can in some cases validly deny a permit to a proposed group home if the home
would be too big, there was no logical connection between that principle and the City’s
actions, and thus the Court found that the law did not survive rational basis review); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 56–58 (1982) (struck down a program that distributed oil money to
residents based on length of state residency because the asserted rationales did not logically
support the law).
154. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
155. A court might even apply heightened scrutiny because license-for-payment laws pose
“a narrow exception to traditional rational basis review: the creation of a wealth classification
that punishes those genuinely unable to pay fees, fines, and restitution more harshly than those
able to pay—that is, it punishes more harshly solely on account of wealth.” Jones v. Governor
of Fla., 950 F.3d 795, 809 (11th Cir. 2020).
156. Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), on recons.,
813 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). See also United States v. Lopez, 415 F. Supp. 3d 422,
427 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“the appropriate standard is that where a defendant who is a member
of a protected group can show that that group has been singled out for reverse sting operations
to a statistically significant extent in comparison with other groups, this is sufficient to warrant
further inquiry and discovery”).
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appears neutral on its face.”157 Inadequate remedial efforts may also
demonstrate a discriminatory purpose.158
If a court finds the data presented here sufficiently compelling, it
possibly can serve as the foundation for an equal protection claim premised
on race. Further, when viewed against the backdrop of the long history of
unequal treatment that people of color have endured throughout the United
States, the data presented in this article raises significant questions as to
whether license-for-payment laws could survive equal protection
challenges.159
2. Rational Basis Review
Even if a court were to apply the most deferential standard—rational
basis review—a license-for-payment law is likely vulnerable to a judicial
finding that it is unconstitutional because the law treats similarly situated
individuals differently on the basis of poverty, and the different treatment
fails to rationally further a legitimate government interest.
The Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to mean that “all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”160 If a law treats
similarly situated individuals differently, and the different treatment is not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the law is violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.161 The Court’s well-established line of precedent
dictates that a statute which penalizes defendants based solely on their
nonpayment of money, without providing for an exception if the defendants
are willing but unable to pay, is the “constitutional equivalent of a statute
that specifically imposes a harsher sanction on indigent defendants than on
non-indigent defendants.”162 Thus, despite judicial reluctance “‘to overturn
governmental action on the ground that it denies equal protection of the

157. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939);
Guinn v. U.S., 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
158. Floyd, 813 F. Supp. at 452–53.
159. “It is deeply troubling if thousands of New Yorkers are being stopped each year
without reasonable suspicion, and even more troubling if African-American and Latino New
Yorkers are being singled out for such treatment.” Id. at 423.
160. U. S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d
150, 169 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
161. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533. See also Jones, 950 F.3d at 810 (“If the question on rational
basis review were simply whether the [legal financial obligation] requirement is rational as
applied to those unable to pay, we think it is clearly not.”).
162. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 660; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Mayer v. City of
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Roberts v. LaVallee,
389 U.S. 40 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956).
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laws,’” when reviewing legislation for a rational basis,163 the Court’s
precedent indicates that the presumption of rationality does not stretch far
enough to allow for the disparate treatment of indigent defendants if the only
goal of the challenged law is to ensure payment and the harsher punishment
inflicted upon indigent defendants (relative to non-indigent defendants)
makes it substantially more difficult for indigent defendants to make
payment.164
In James v. Strange, for example, the Court found that a state
recoupment statute for legal defense fees expended for the benefit of indigent
defendants failed to evenly treat indigent criminal defendants with other
classes of debtors and discriminatorily “blight[ed]” “the hopes of indigents
for self-sufficiency and self-respect.”165 It therefore found that the law
“embodie[d] elements of punitiveness and discrimination which violate[d]
the rights of citizens to equal treatment under the law,” and thus upheld the
injunction enjoining the law’s enforcement.166
License-for-payment laws should be found to violate the Equal
Protection Clause because they treat similarly situated people—people with
outstanding traffic-related debt—differently based on their ability to pay.
More specifically, they punish poor people with the suspension of their
driver’s license and the consequences that ensue therefrom, but do not inflict
such unduly harsh punishment on those with the means to pay. As explained
throughout this article, license-for-payment laws permit suspensions for
FTP/FTA, but often do not permit inquiry into the reasons for the
nonpayment or nonappearance, consideration of whether the requirement to
repay will deprive an individual and their family of their livelihood, nor the
imposition of alternatives. The loss of a driver’s license results in a cascade
of hardship—whether it be job loss, additional fines, fees, and costs, or a
conviction for driving with a suspended license, for example—that people of
means completely avoid by paying traffic tickets and related costs in full.
This kind of discriminatory treatment of similarly situated people is
proscribed by the Constitution when the treatment does not rationally further
a legitimate government interest.167

163. Hayden, 594 F.3d at 170 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470–71
(1991)).
164. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 660; Tate, 401 U.S. at 395; Mayer, 404 U.S. at 189;
Williams, 399 U.S. at 235; Roberts, 389 U.S. at 40; Douglas, 372 U.S. at 353; Griffin, 351
U.S. at 12.
165. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141–42 (1972).
166. Id. at 142.
167. Moreover, any plausible public benefit derived from the law is significantly
outweighed by the demonstrable harm. This also counsels that the laws fail the rational basis
test. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Cmm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 343–46 (1989); Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 207 (1982).
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As discussed in-depth above, license for payment laws should be found
to not rationally further any legitimate government interest because they do
not result in the collection of outstanding debt—they are actually
counterproductive in that they impede individuals’ ability to pay the fines
and fees underlying their traffic debt suspensions. Likewise, they do not
make roads safer; indeed, they actually have the perverse effect of making
highways less safe.
Therefore, because license-for-payment laws
discriminate between similarly situated people, and such discriminatory
treatment does not rationally further any legitimate government interest, the
laws should not survive Equal Protection challenges.
B. Eighth Amendment Proscription Against Excessive Fines
The Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to extract
payments, whether in cash or in kind, “as punishment for some offense,” and
applies to, among other things, civil in rem forfeiture proceedings.168
“[B]oth the Eighth Amendment and section 10 of the English Bill of Rights
of 1689, from which it derives, were intended to prevent the government
from abusing its power to punish.”169 Thus, the determinative question for
purposes of whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies is whether the
government action in question, at least in part, constitutes punishment.170
The U.S. Supreme Court “consistently has recognized that forfeiture
serves, at least in part, to punish the owner.”171 Like forfeitures, license-forpayment laws serve to punish drivers for traffic debt. Although a state may
aver that such a law is a collection tool rather than a punishment, research
demonstrates that it does not operate as a collection tool,172 and actually
punishes people with suspending their driving privileges (and the
consequences that flow from not having a valid license) for nonpayment.
Indeed, that driver’s license suspensions were first introduced, in part, for
the purpose of “punishing unsafe drivers” evinces that driver’s licenses are,
in fact, intended to be punitive.173 Even if the law were found to be a
collection tool, a court could find that it simultaneously serves as punishment
168. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610–11 (1993) (quoting Browning–Ferris
Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)).
169. Austin, 509 U.S. at 607 (citing Browning–Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. 257, 266–67).
170. Id. at 610. “‘It is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive
as well as remedial goals.’” Id. (citation omitted).
171. Id. at 618.
172. In New York, nearly half of the traffic suspensions issued in 2016 remained in effect
one year later, indicating that suspensions do not serve the purpose of collecting outstanding
traffic debt. Weiss & Wilner, supra note 3. In Florida, 77.12% of driver’s license
suspensions, on average, remained in effect after a two-year period. Whitelemons et al., supra
note 20.
173. AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, supra note 82 at 4.
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(as it does), which renders the Excessive Fines Clause applicable.174 Further,
license-for-payment laws undoubtedly serve a deterrent penal purpose,
which gives rise to the inference they are punitive,175 because they purport
to use driver’s license suspensions as a means to deter people from not
paying or appearing to contest traffic tickets.176 Moreover, a driver’s license
is a property right protected by the U.S. Constitution,177 a right which is
effectively forfeited upon the suspension of a driver’s license. Thus, at a
minimum, driver’s license suspensions are analogous to civil forfeitures,
thereby warranting the same Eighth Amendment protections178 against
government encroachment.179

174. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (“[S]anctions frequently serve more than one purpose. We
need not exclude the possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial purposes to conclude that it
is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause.”).
175. See, e.g., Dee Potter, A Critical Look at Texas's License Suspension Act: Does the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause Prohibit the Revocation of Professional Licenses
for Nonpayment of Child Support?, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 493, 504 (1996). (“Due to its partially
punitive nature, the License Suspension Act [which authorized the suspension of professional
licenses for nonpayments of child support] falls within the reach of the Excessive Fines
Clause.”).
176. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 U.S. 682, 689 (2019) (noting that deterrence is a penal goal).
177. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
178. In fact, the Court’s jurisprudence supports the expansion of Eighth Amendment
protections to relatively new practices, like driver’s license suspensions, that did not exist at
the time the Constitution was written. The Court has specifically explained that when
considering the Eighth Amendment: “‘Time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is particularly true of constitutions.’”
Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 273 (citing Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910))
(finding that the state did not “take a positive step to punish, . . . nor [use] the civil courts to
extracts large payments or forfeitures for the purpose of raising revenue or disabling some
individual”). It is also noteworthy that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
found the Eighth Amendment applies to civil penalties levied by local municipalities.
Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, No. 18-56553, 2020 WL 4197744, at *3 (9th Cir. July 22,
2020) (holding that Timbs “affirmatively opens the door for Eighth Amendment challenges
to fines imposed by state and local authorities”) (citing Vasudeva v. U.S., 214 F.3d 1155,
1161–62 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing the constitutionality of civil monetary penalties for
trafficking in federal food stamps) and Balice v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 203 F.3d 684, 698–99
(9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing the constitutionality of civil fines levies pursuant to the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act)).
179. See State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 21 (Ind. 2019) (“When a civil forfeiture is even
partly punitive, it implicates the Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive fines.”);
Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 139–40 (2003) (where a civil forfeiture “serves, at
least in part, deterrent and retributive purposes” it is punitive and thus subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause). See also Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on
Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 158–59 (1995) (“The range of
civil sanctions that could potentially fall within the scope of the Eighth Amendment is
daunting [and] includes . . . driver's license suspensions. . . .”).
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In February 2019, the Supreme Court unanimously incorporated the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fine Clause, making it applicable to states
and their subdivisions.180 The Court determined that “[p]rotection against
excessive punitive economic sanctions secured by the Clause is, . . . both
‘fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty’ and ‘deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.’”181 In reaching its determination to
incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court traced back the roots of
the Clause to Magna Carta, which required “that economic sanctions ‘be
proportioned to the wrong’ and ‘not be so large as to deprive [an offender]
of his livelihood.’”182 Furthermore, the Court suggested that courts ought to
pay particularly close attention when evaluating whether punishments used
to generate revenue for state and local government are excessive.183 It
explained that “[e]xorbitant [fines] undermine other constitutional liberties,”
and are sometimes employed by governments “‘in a measure out of accord
with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence,’ for ‘fines are a source of
revenue,’ while other forms of punishment ‘cost a State money.’”184
As an initial matter, traffic debt suspensions too often result in the
deprivation of peoples’ livelihoods. As discussed above, research shows that
suspensions lead to job loss and lost job opportunities. Further, license-forpayment schemes make it exceedingly difficult for many to regain their
livelihoods post-suspension for they render it practically cost prohibitive,
relative to the resources of those who are issued traffic debt suspensions, for
many people to get their licenses reinstated. The laws’ effects of depriving
individuals of their livelihood are suggestive of an Excessive Fines Clause
violation.
The Court, in its historical analysis, elucidated that even though thirtyfive out of thirty-seven states had ratified excessive fines provisions in their
constitutions by 1868, abuses still continued:
Following the Civil War, Southern States enacted Black Codes
to subjugate newly freed slaves and maintain the prewar racial
hierarchy. Among these laws' provisions were draconian fines for
violating broad proscriptions on ‘vagrancy’ and other dubious

180. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (citations omitted). However, the Court did
not unanimously agree upon the vehicle through which the Clause should be incorporated.
181. Id. at 689 (citation omitted).
182. Id. at 688 (citation omitted).
183. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979 (1991) (“It
makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit”)
(opinion of Scalia, J.)).
184. Id.
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offenses. When newly freed slaves were unable to pay imposed
fines, States often demanded involuntary labor instead.185
Black Codes used fines to subject people of color to involuntary
servitude.186 The use of fines to coerce involuntary labor was discussed at
length during congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and other similar measures.187 The modern-day
practice of punishing people for traffic debt bears a disturbing resemblance
to the use of Black Codes,188 which have long been held unconstitutional.189
The data presented and consequences of driver’s license suspensions
discussed in this article evince the existence of a coercive traffic debt
suspensions infrastructure that unduly subjugates people of color. Given the
importance the architects of our constitutional framework have assigned to
the prohibition of excessive fines throughout the development of our
democracy, and their use against people of color in the post-Reconstruction
Era, a scheme that disproportionately (and excessively) punishes people of
color, and does so for their inability to pay, should not survive constitutional
muster on Eighth Amendment grounds, assuming of course that a court finds
that the Excessive Fines Clause applies.
Once the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Excessive Fine
Clause was an incorporated protection applicable to the states, it remanded
the case to the Indiana Supreme Court. The Indiana Supreme Court had to
determine, among other things, the proper standard by which courts should
assess whether in rem forfeitures are excessive. To do so, the court analyzed
the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior precedent,190 which led it to conclude that
185. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688–89 (citations omitted).
186. Justice Thomas explained the “centerpiece” of the Black Codes “was their ‘attempt
to stabilize the black work force and limit its economic options apart from planation labor.’”
Id. at 697 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (citation omitted).
187. Id. at 689 (citations omitted).
188. For instance, a Mississippi law imposed fifty dollars in fines and ten days’
imprisonment on “freedmen, free negroes and mulattoes” “without lawful employment”
convicted of vagrancy. If those convicted did not pay within five days, “they would be
arrested and leased to ‘any person who [would], for the shortest period of service, pay said
fine and forfeiture and all costs.” Id. at 697 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (citation
omitted). An Alabama law was criticized for “almost reenacting slavery” by, “among other
harsh inflictions” imposing a fifty-dollar fine and [six] months’ imprisonment on any servant
or laborer who loitered away his time or was stubborn or refractory. Id. at 697–98 (citation
omitted). A Florida vagrancy law afforded judges the discretion to punish those convicted
with a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment for up to twelve months, or “by being sold for a
term not exceeding twelve months.” Id. at 698 (citation omitted).
189. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Such practices were also
outlawed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
190. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); Austin, 509 U.S. at 602.

DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS FOR NONPAYMENTS

Fall 2020

DRIVERS LICENSE SUSPENSIONS FOR NONPAYMENTS

111

gross proportionality is the proper standard to apply to determine whether an
in rem forfeiture is excessive.191 Though only useful as persuasive authority
outside of Indiana, the court explained:
To conduct a proportionality analysis at all, we need to
consider the punishment's magnitude. And the owner's economic
means—relative to the property's value [or fine]—is an appropriate
consideration for determining that magnitude. To hold the opposite
would generate a new fiction: that taking away the same piece of
property [or demanding the same fine] from a billionaire and from
someone who owns nothing else punishes each person equally.192
The court elaborated that the “historical roots of the Excessive Fines
Clause” command a focus on the economic effects a fine has on the punished
individual.193 “Magna Carta—from which the [Excessive Fines] Clause
derives—specifically contemplated an economic sanction's effect on the
wrongdoer, requiring ‘that [fines] be proportioned to the offense and that
they should not deprive a wrongdoer of his livelihood.’”194 The court
therefore concluded that to determine if a forfeiture is excessive, the effect
of the forfeiture on the owner must be considered.195
191. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d at 35.
192. Id. at 36.
193. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d, at 37.
194. Id. at 37 (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335). “‘[N]o man shall have a larger
amercement imposed upon him, than his circumstances or personal estate will bear. . . .’”
Timbs, 139 S. Ct. 682, 694 (2019) (quoting W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 372 (1769)). “[N]o man shall be amerced even to the full extent of his means
. . . .” Id. at 688 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting HENRY HALLAM, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF HENRY VII TO THE DEATH
OF GEORGE II 46–47 (2d ed. 1829)).
195. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688. It is also worth consideration that although a defendant’s
ability to pay has generally only been analyzed as a relevant consideration with respect to
criminal forfeitures in federal courts, it should certainly be a relevant consideration in the context
of the forfeiture of driver’s licenses because one’s inability to pay is precisely what underlies
and, in fact, causes the forfeiture of the driver’s license. See, e.g., United States v. Viloski, 814
F.3d 104, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen analyzing a forfeiture's proportionality under the
Excessive Fines Clause, courts may consider . . . whether the forfeiture would deprive the
defendant of his livelihood, i.e., his ‘future ability to earn a living’”) (citations omitted); United
States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[A] court should consider a defendant's
argument that a forfeiture is excessive under the Eighth Amendment when it effectively would
deprive the defendant of his or her livelihood . . . [and] it is not inconceivable that a forfeiture
could be so onerous as to deprive a defendant of his or her future ability to earn a living, thus
implicating the historical concerns underlying the Excessive Fines Clause.”); United States v.
6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 740–42 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that forfeiture of the
father’s home of twenty-two years for the acts of his son was an excessive fine barred by the
Eighth Amendment). As explained above, this in and of itself presents a constitutional violation,
separate and apart from the Excessive Fines Clause.
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Many courts, including the N.Y. Court of Appeals, have conducted
proportionality analyses that have taken an individual’s economic means into
account, as the Indiana Supreme Court determined was appropriate in Timbs.
When considering whether a punitive forfeiture is grossly disproportional so
as to violate the Excessive Fines Clause, New York courts consider, among
other things, both “the seriousness of the crime [or violation] . . . [and] the
economic circumstances of the defendant.”196 Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals has explicitly stated that “the forfeiture of an automobile for a minor
traffic infraction such as driving with a broken taillight or failing to signal
would surely be ‘grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s
offense.’”197 The Court continued: “By encompassing many minor and
technical violations that could not justify forfeiture, the ordinance, as
enacted, risks violation of the Excessive Fines Clause.”198 Considering that
the effect of an automobile forfeiture and the suspension of a driver’s license
is in essence the same—the impacted individual is deprived of the ability to
drive—it follows that a court would likely find that the suspension of a
driver’s license for a nonappearance or nonpayment related to “a minor
traffic infraction such as driving with a broken taillight or failing to signal”
violates the Excessive Fines Clause.199
Many license-for-payment laws require neither a determination
regarding whether payment would deprive an individual of their livelihood,
nor a determination of an individual’s ability to pay in any stage that leads
to a traffic debt suspension. Therefore, the proportionality of the punishment
relative to the individual is never assessed. If it were, in many instances, the
suspension of a driver’s license would likely be found excessive. This is
obviously problematic, particularly given that throughout New York, for
example, the driver’s license suspension rate in the ten poorest zip codes is
nearly nine times higher than the suspension rate in the ten wealthiest zip
codes.200 The gravity of this issue is compounded particularly for low196. Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 141 (2003) Additionally, New York courts
consider “the severity of the harm caused and of the potential harm had the defendant not
been caught, the relative value of the forfeited property and the maximum punishment to
which defendant could have been subject for the crimes charged.” Id. (citing Bajakajian, 524
U.S. at 334). See also Nez Perce Cty. Prosecuting Attorney v. Reese, 142 Idaho 893, 899 (Ct.
App. 2006) (relevant factors include “the intangible or subjective value of the property, the
hardship to the defendant . . . and the effect of forfeiture on innocent occupants or children
when evaluating the subjective value of the property or the harshness of the forfeiture . . . [as
well as] the effect of forfeiture on the defendant's family or financial circumstances”) (citing
United States v. 25445 Via Dona Christa, 138 F.3d 403, 409 (9th Cir. 1998); State v. 633 East
640 North, 994 P.2d 1254, 1258–59 (Utah 2000); United States v. 45 Claremont St., 395 F.3d
1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Dodge Caravan, 387 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 2004)).
197. Canavan, 1 N.Y.2d at 141 (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Weiss & Wilner, supra note 3.
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income people because the practical effect of their driver’s license
suspension is permanent suspension due to the mass accumulation of fines,
fees, surcharges, and other costs that attach thereto, which they will unlikely
be able to pay. If a court were to find the Excessive Fines Clause applicable,
license-for-payments laws are also problematic to the extent that they punish
people without consideration of their economic circumstances.201 Likewise,
the laws fail to account for the lack of serious circumstances that underlie
traffic debt suspensions. Surely, driving while intoxicated is more serious
than not paying a traffic ticket or appearing in court to contest it, yet they are
both punishable with license suspensions. That is difficult to reconcile, both
on the facts and law.
In brief, it is difficult (if not impossible) to conceive of a world in which
indefinite driver’s license suspension could be found a proportional
punishment for traffic debt, which people—through no fault of their own—
lack the means to pay. Similarly, it is difficult (if not impossible) to justify
that people of means, relative to their resources, suffer little to no harm when
faced with traffic tickets and related costs, whereas low-income people face
a cascading snowball effect that results in a mountain of debt and permanent
driver’s license suspension. Because many license-for-payment laws do not
require consideration of an individual’s economic circumstances prior to
suspension, if a court were to find the Excessive Fines Clause applicable, it
should also find that many driver’s license suspensions are an excessive
punishment.
C. Implementing Regulations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964
Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance.”202 A crucial
purpose for which Title VI was enacted was to prevent indirect, but
nonetheless invidious, discrimination through the use of federal funds.203
Federal agencies that are empowered to provide federal financial assistance
are authorized and directed to effectuate Title VI by issuing rules,
regulations, and orders of general applicability.204
Federal grants,
cooperative agreements, loans, and arrangements to use federal property all
201. See, e.g., Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d at 141.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
203. See H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 12 (1963); 110 CONG. REC.
6544 (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 110 CONG. REC. 2468 (1964); 110 CONG. REC. 7054
(1964) (statement of Sen. Pastore).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
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qualify as federal assistance within the meaning of Title VI.205 If a recipient
of federal funds fails to comply with any requirement adopted by an agency
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 2000d-1, the agency must first inform the
recipient of their failure to comply and seek their compliance by voluntary
means.206 If the recipient fails to comply, the agency is then empowered to
seek compliance through the termination of assistance or refusal to grant
continued assistance, or enforcement proceedings through the courts.207
“Most [f]ederal agencies have adopted regulations that prohibit
recipients of [f]ederal funds from using criteria or methods of administering
their programs that have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination
based on race, color, or national origin.”208 Such regulations permissibly
prohibit practices that have a disparate impact on protected groups, even if
the practices are not intentionally discriminatory,209 and carry the full force
and effect of law.210
Disparate impact is established by demonstrating, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that a facially neutral policy has a disparate impact on a
protected group, in violation of federal agency regulations, without a
“substantial legitimate justification.”211 The consequences of the allegedly
205. 28 C.F.R. § 42.102(c); 28 C.F.R. § 42.105.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
207. Id. See, e.g., Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215, 1221–22 (D.D.C. 1976).
208. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TITLE VI MANUAL (2001).
209. Id. “[R]egulations [promulgated under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1] may validly prohibit
practices having a disparate impact on protected groups, even if the actions or practices are
not intentionally discriminatory. Id. (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S.
582 (1983); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. at 287, 292–94 (1985); Elston v. Talladega Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993), rehearing denied, 7 F.3d 242 (11th Cir.
1993)).
210. Blackshear Residents Org. v. Hous. Auth. of City of Austin, 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146
(W.D. Tex. 1971) (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development regulation
governing site selection for public housing projects has force and effect of law, and constitutes
a presumptively valid interpretation of requirements of Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964)
(citing Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969)); Lee v. Macon
Cty. Bd. of Ed., 270 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (regulation of U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare in carrying out obligation to see that federal funds do not go to state
supported programs in which there is discrimination based on race or color has the force and
effect of law).
211. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 507 (11th Cir. 1999), revisited on other grounds
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, (2001) (citing Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d
1175, 1202 (11th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted); N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v.
State of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1038 (2d Cir. 1995). In Sandoval, the court determined
that the Alabama Department of Public Safety's official policy of administering its driver's
license examination only in the English language had a disparate impact on basis of national
origin, in violation of Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964. It further found that the policy
adversely affected individuals in form of lost opportunities, social services, and other quality
of life pursuits and that the vast majority of residents who could not obtain licenses because
they were not sufficiently fluent in English were from countries other than the United States.
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discriminatory practice, rather than the motivations for it, are the focus of
disparate impact inquiry.212
This article again uses New York as an example. While some states
may be more reliant on federal funds than others, all states do accept federal
funding, which could be jeopardized if the state in question’s license-forpayment scheme has an impermissible disparate impact.
i. New York Accepts Federal Funds
New York State, its subdivisions, and its municipalities receive federal
funding; thus, they must comply with funding agency regulations that
implement Title VI. If they do not comply, complaints may be filed with the
relevant funding agencies, which then investigate the complaints and take
appropriate action to ensure compliance.
In 2019, New York, its subdivisions, and its municipalities were
collectively awarded $180.1 billion in prime awards from federal
agencies.213 Notably and relevant to driver’s license suspensions, well over
$65 billion of those funds were awarded by the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT).214 In 2019, the DOT issued more than 3,600 grants
totaling over $995 million to New York, its subdivisions, and its
municipalities.215 The New York State DMV received a $647,500 prime
award,216 and six sub-awards totaling over twenty-seven million217 from the
Sandoval, 197 F.3d at 508–11. While the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision to the extent that it held that there is no private right of action to enforce disparateimpact regulations promulgated under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, it did not address “whether the
DOJ regulation was authorized by [42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1], or whether the [lower] courts . . .
were correct to hold that the English-only policy had the effect of discriminating on the basis
of national origin.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293. Further, the DOJ itself has explained that
although Sandoval foreclosed private judicial enforcement of Title VI disparate impact it did
not undermine the validity of those regulations or otherwise limit the authority and
responsibility of federal grant agencies to enforce their own implementing regulations.
Therefore, the agencies' disparate impact regulations continue to be a vital administrative
enforcement mechanism. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 208.
212. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 208, at 48 (citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563,
568 (1974)).
213. New York FY 2019 State Profile, USASPENDING, https://www.usaspend
ing.gov/#/state/36 (last visited Dec. 9, 2019).
214. Department of Transportation Amounts Obligated to New York FY 2019,
USASPENDING, https://www.usaspending.gov/#/search/93e04a4292ba460900986f18bc0b5594.
215. Id.
216. Award ID Fain No. DTNH2217H00108.
217. Award ID Fain Nos. 18X920405bNY17; 18X920405cNY16; 18X920405fNY15;
18X920405hNY17; 69A37518300004020NY0; 69A3751830000405dNYL. It is worth
mentioning that Award ID Fain Nos. 18X920405cNY16 and 69A3751830000405dNY
collectively include $578,763 in sub-awards to the New York Office of Court Administration
“to assist the courts in fulfilling their obligation to efficiently adjudicate traffic infractions and
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in 2019.218 Moreover, the
Governor’s Traffic Safety Committee (GTSC), which serves as a liaison with
federal government agencies on highway safety programs and policies,
receives federal funds, which it appropriates to the DMV. In 2019, the GTSC
received just south of $20.5 million in federal funding, in addition to
seventeen federally funded full-time employees.219 Further, the DOJ issued
eighteen Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne
JAG)220 awards totaling $13,502,275 to entities within New York.221 The
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services received $8,576,883,
with the remaining $4,925,392 going to various localities and their
respective agencies.222
As New York State, as well as its subdivisions and municipalities,
accept these funds from the DOT and DOJ, they are required to abide by the
agencies’ regulations regarding nondiscrimination in federally assisted
programs. Per the DOT and DOJ regulations that implement Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, funding recipients may not, among other
discriminatory actions:
misdemeanors” and to “address the issues of timeliness, accuracy and completeness of traffic
records.” Department of Transportation Amounts Obligated to New York FY 2019, supra
note 214.
218. Department of Transportation Amounts Obligated to New York FY 2019, supra note
214.
219. MOTOR VEHICLES, DEPARTMENT OF, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF THE BUDGET,
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy20/exec/agencies/appropData/MotorVehiclesDe
partmentof.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2019).
220. Under the Byrne JAG program, states and localities may apply for funds to support
criminal justice programs in a variety of categories, including law enforcement, prosecution,
crime prevention, corrections, drug treatment, technology, victim and witness services, and
mental health. 34 U.S.C. §§ 10152(a)(1), 10153(a). The funds are disbursed according to a
formula based on the particular jurisdiction's population and violent crime statistics. Id. §
10156. Grantees may also make subgrants to localities or community organizations. Id. §
10152(b). Some state funds are set aside for subgrants to localities. Id. § 10156(c)(2).
States of New York v. Dep't of Just., 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
221. Awards Made for BJA FY 19 Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
(JAG) Program - State Solicitation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
https://external.ojp.usdoj.gov/selector/title?solicitationTitle=BJA%20FY%2019%20Edward
%20Byrne%20Memorial%20Justice%20Assistance%20Grant%20(JAG)%20Program%20%20State%20Solicitation&po=All (last visited Dec. 9, 2019); Awards Made for Solicitation
BJA FY 19 Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program - Local
Solicitation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, https://external.ojp.usdoj.
gov/SelectorServer/awards/pdf/solicitation/BJA%20FY%2019%20Edward%20Byrne%20M
emorial%20Justice%20Assistance%20Grant%20(JAG)%20Program%20-%20Local%20Sol
icitation (last visited Dec. 9, 2019).
222. Awards Made for BJA FY 19 Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
(JAG) Program - State Solicitation, supra note 221. Awards Made for Solicitation BJA FY 19
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program - Local Solicitation, supra
note 221.
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(i) Deny an individual any disposition, service, financial
aid, or benefit provided under the program;
(ii) Provide any disposition, service, financial aid, or
benefit to an individual which is different, or is provided in a
different manner, from that provided to others under the
program;
(iii) Subject an individual to segregation or separate
treatment in any matter related to his receipt of any disposition,
service, financial aid, or benefit under the program;
(iv) Restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of
any advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any
disposition, service, financial aid, or benefit under the program;
(v) Treat an individual differently from others in
determining whether he satisfies any admission, enrollment,
quota, eligibility, membership, or other requirement or
condition which individuals must meet in order to be provided
any disposition, service, financial aid, function or benefit
provided under the program; or
(vi) Deny an individual an opportunity to participate in the
program through the provision of services or otherwise or afford
him an opportunity to do so which is different from that afforded
others under the program (including the opportunity to
participate in the program as an employee but only to the extent
set forth in paragraph (c) of this section).
(vii) Deny a person the opportunity to participate as a
member of a planning or advisory body which is an integral part
of the program.223
Further, funding recipients may not “utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the
effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the
objectives of the program as respects individuals of a particular race, color,
or national origin.”224
223. 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(1). “The enumeration of specific
forms of prohibited discrimination in this paragraph and in paragraph (c) of this section does
not limit the generality of the prohibition in paragraph (a) of this section.” 28 C.F.R. §
42.104(b)(5).
224. 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (emphasis added); 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (emphasis added).
The purpose of the regulations is to ensure that “no person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, [is] excluded from participation in, . . . denied the
benefits of, or otherwise be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
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ii. New York’s Driver’s License Suspension Scheme
Discriminatorily Impacts People of Color
To establish that a law violates Title VI regulations, it must be
demonstrated that the law entails a program, policy, or practice that has a
“discriminatory impact.”225 “Once such a showing has been made, the
burden shifts to the [proponent of the law] to demonstrate the existence of ‘a
substantial legitimate justification’ for the allegedly discriminatory
practice.”226 If that burden is sustained, the challenger “may still prove his
case by demonstrating that other less discriminatory means would serve the
same objective.”227
The data presented in Appendix 1 of this article demonstrate that New
Yorkers of color are discriminatorily impacted by New York’s license-forpayment scheme.228 To recap: in New York City, the driver’s license
suspension rate in the ten zip codes with the highest concentrations of people
of color is two-and-a-half times higher than in the zip codes with the most
concentrated white populations; outside of New York City, the suspension
rate in the ten zip codes with the highest concentration of people of color is
four times higher than in the ten zip codes with the most concentrated white
populations.229 And, no substantial legitimate justification exists for this
discriminatory impact imposed by the law. The law is ineffective in
collecting outstanding traffic debt, and also jeopardizes public safety. It is
therefore devoid of any legitimate justification, let alone a substantial one,
for the disparate impact it has on people of color. Finally, there are several
less discriminatory means that would serve the objective of New York’s law:
the law could allow for reduced, waived, or deferred payments, partial
payments, payment plans, community service, or other alternatives. These
means would also more effectively serve to collect outstanding debt.

receiving Federal financial assistance from the Department of Justice.” 49 C.F.R. § 21.1; 28
C.F.R. § 42.101. They apply “to any program for which Federal financial assistance is
authorized under a law administered by the Department.” 49 C.F.R. § 21.3; 28 C.F.R. §
42.103.
225. N.Y. Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036 (citing Ga. State Conf. of Branches of NAACP
v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir.1985)); Larry P. By Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d
969, 982 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Bd. of Educ. of N.Y. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151 (1979)).
226. See N.Y. Urban League, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1036 (citing Ga. State Conf., 775 F.2d at
1417).
227. Id. (citing Ga. State Conf., 775 F.2d at 1417; Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982 n. 10).
228. It should be noted that the New York Legislature passed the Driver’s License
Suspension Reform Act during the 2019–2020 Legislative Session. As of the date of this
article, Governor Cuomo has yet to sign the bill into law.
229. Weiss & Wilner, supra note 2.
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For these reasons, New York’s license-for-payment scheme likely
violates 49 C.F.R. section 21.5(b) and 28 C.F.R. section 42.104(b). The
DOT and the DOJ have affirmative duties under 42 U.S.C. section 2000d–1
to investigate discriminatory activities that receive federal funds and take
appropriate enforcement actions to ensure Title VI’s mandate is given
effect.230 Therefore, if New York fails to bring its law into compliance with
these regulations, the State, as well as its subdivisions, municipalities, and
law enforcement agencies stand to lose substantial DOT and DOJ funding
and/or face enforcement action in court. The same is true for any other state
that accepts DOT and DOJ funding.

Conclusion
Laws that authorize driver’s license suspensions for traffic debt are not
only unsound policy, they are legally flawed. License-for-payment schemes
disproportionately impact low-income communities and communities of
color. They are also counterproductive in achieving their purported purposes
and serve only to further compound the symptoms of systemic racism that
already so deeply plague our society. For these reasons, states that continue
to engage in this pernicious practice should reverse course and reinstate the
driver’s licenses of the millions of Americans who have had them unjustly
suspended or revoked.

230. Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215, 1221–22 (D.D.C. 1976) (citing Adams v.
Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1231
New York City
Zip Code

10474
10456
10457
10473
10460
10466
10454
10469
10461
10470
10465
10464
Zip Code

10303
10302
10304
10310
10301
10314
10306
10312
10308
10309

The Bronx
Percentage of
Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
99.1%
98.7%
98.4%
98.0%
97.3%
97.2%
96.5%
88.3%
62.3%
57.9%
53.4%
29.6%
Staten Island
Percentage of
Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
78.3%
62.5%
61.8%
56.4%
56.2%
34.8%
22.7%
15.9%
14.3%
11.7%

Traffic Debt
Suspensions Per 1,000
People
70
61
66
64
62
68
74
54
43
46
46
31
Traffic Debt
Suspensions Per 1,000
People
135
98
92
79
81
43
51
42
38
48

231. All data retrieved from Weiss & Wilner, supra note 3 (analyzing data from the New
York Dep’t of Motor Vehicles 2016-2017).
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Upstate and Long Island
Upstate
Zip Code

12206
12307
12210
12308
12305
12303
12205
12211
12009
12186
12158
12059
12193
Zip Code

14208
14215
14204
14211
14203
14212
14207
14216
14226
14222
14225
14220

Albany and Surrounding Area
Traffic Debt
Percentage of
Suspensions Per 1,000
Driving-Age
People
Population, People of
Color
69.9%
112
69.7%
180
56.7%
102
40.6%
84
35.1%
89
22.8%
62
17.1%
37
12.2%
19
6.8%
20
5.6%
17
4.1%
30
2.3%
34
0.0%
32
Buffalo and Surrounding Area
Traffic Debt
Percentage of
Suspensions Per 1,000
Driving-Age
People
Population, People of
Color
89.4%
163
86.4%
168
85.5%
130
84.4%
182
63.7%
92
49.9%
108
46.8%
72
25.4%
43
22.0%
23
21.7%
21
16.8%
35
11.4%
40
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Rochester and Surrounding Area
Zip Code
Percentage of
Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
14605
88.5%
14621
81.4%
14619
81.2%
14608
76.3%
14611
73.6%
14613
66.4%
14609
48.6%
14606
38.6%
14615
37.3%
14624
17.8%
14618
16.2%
14610
14.8%
14617
11.3%
Zip Code

13202
13205
13207
13208
13204
13203
13224
13210
13214
13078
13116
13215

Vol. 48:1

Traffic Debt
Suspensions Per 1,000
People
271
265
268
266
335
300
179
156
175
52
22
37
45

Syracuse and Surrounding Area
Percentage of
Traffic Debt
Driving-Age
Suspensions Per 1,000
Population, People of
People
Color
67.0%
66
63.7%
104
46.1%
96
43.0%
67
42.7%
97
42.6%
62
42.1%
63
40.5%
44
24.4%
29
14.9%
9
10.4%
29
5.8%
17
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Zip Code

11575
11550
11553
11003
11520
11590
11510
11542
11558
11561
11554
11530
Zip Code

11798
11717
11722
11701
11706
11749
11713
11091
11932
11950
11953
11944
11976
11719
11787
11739

Long Island
Nassau County
Percentage of
Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
98.3%
91.9%
91.2%
82.4%
73.9%
58.8%
55.5%
39.6%
28.6%
22.1%
19.0%
11.1%
Suffolk County
Percentage of
Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
91.1%
84.5%
76.3%
64.3%
62.2%
51.6%
47.1%
39.3%
38.7%
36.4%
30.6%
26.1%
17.9%
16.4%
8.7%
6.0%

123

Traffic Debt
Suspensions Per 1,000
People
136
92
98
71
80
63
59
34
45
30
17
10
Traffic Debt
Suspensions Per 1,000
People
177
90
101
86
72
74
118
76
67
100
77
53
22
35
18
11
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Appendix 2
The data that follow demonstrate that various law enforcement agencies
in New York disproportionately stop people of color.
1. New York State Police
In response to the Stanford Open Policing Project’s request for trafficstop data, the New York State Police provided limited information regarding
7,962,169 traffic stops they conducted between December 2009 and
December 2017.232 The charts below summarize pertinent available trafficstop data from the 2017 calendar year across seven counties, and compare
the data to the relevant 2017 population demographics.233
Percentage of Population Compared with Percentage of Total Stops
Albany County
percentage of population
percentage of total stops
white drivers
71.8%
66.17%
Black drivers
12.1%
20.53%
Hispanic or
5.96%
5.81%
Latinx drivers
Broome County
white drivers
Black drivers
Hispanic or
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
84.0%
5.06%
3.99%

percentage of total stops
68.78%
14.25%
6.01%

Erie County
white drivers
Black drivers
Hispanic or
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
75.3%
12.7%
5.47%

percentage of total stops
71.21%
16.97%
3.84%

232. Data retrieved from Pierson et al., supra note 26 and DATAUSA, https://datausa.io
(last visited Dec. 31, 2019). As discussed below, New York law does not mandate the
collection and analysis of traffic-stop data. See infra Appendix 5.
233. Data retrieved from Pierson et al., supra note 26 and DATAUSA, https://datausa.io
(last visited Dec. 31, 2019). As discussed in Appendix 5, New York law does not mandate
the collection and analysis of traffic-stop data. See infra Appendix 5.
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Monroe County
white drivers
Black drivers
Hispanic
or
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
70.3%
14.4%
8.79%

percentage of total stops
53.58%
31.38%
10.55%

Nassau County
white drivers
Black drivers
Hispanic or
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
59.6%
11.1%
17.2%

percentage of total stops
36.91%
24.59%
17.89%

Onondaga County
white drivers
Black drivers
Hispanic or
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
76.5%
11.0%
4.88%

percentage of total stops
70.76%
19.81%
3.57%

Suffolk County
white drivers
Black drivers
Hispanic or
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
67.1%
7.35%
19.5%

percentage of total stops
48.81%
14.83%
27.40%

2. Suffolk County Police Department
Pursuant to a settlement agreement between the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD), the SCPD
is required to collect data regarding traffic stops.234 Traffic-stop data is
produced quarterly and is available to the public.235
The most recent data available estimates that the total population of
Suffolk County is approximately 1,487,902 people, at least 78.3% of which
is of driving age.236 An analysis of the 2018 traffic-stop data reveals that the
234. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND
SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEP’T (2014).
235. SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEP’T, HISTORICAL STOP DATA (2020). Although the
SCPD has achieved partial compliance with the agreement, it has yet to come into full
compliance with the traffic-stop data practices mandated by its agreement with the DOJ. See
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEVENTH REPORT ASSESSING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE
BY SUFFOLK CTY. POLICE DEP’T 6–7 (2018).
236. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2018 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (2018),
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?g=0500000US36103&d=ACS%205Year%20Estimates%20Data%20Profiles&tid=ACSDP5Y2018.DP05&hidePreview=true.
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SCPD engaged in 166,739 traffic stops in 2018.237 The chart below
summarizes pertinent available traffic-stop data from the 2018 calendar year,
and compares the data to the most recent available population demographic
estimates.
Suffolk County
white drivers
Black drivers
Hispanic
or
Latinx drivers

Suffolk County 2018
percentage of population
68.5%
7.2%
18.6%

percentage of total stops
56.22%
17.69%
19.55%

Relative to the percentage of the population that Black individuals make
up, it is clear that they are disproportionately subjected to traffic stops by the
SCPD.238
3. Buffalo Police Department
According to data obtained from the Buffalo Police Department (BPD)
by attorneys representing clients in litigation that alleges unconstitutional
law enforcement practices, the BPD’s Strike Force conducted more than
1,700 checkpoints between January 2013 and October 2017.239 The data
shows that nearly forty percent of the checkpoints conducted between
January 2013 and June 2017 were conducted in three of Buffalo’s seventyseven census tracts, in which the Black or Hispanic or Latinx populations
exceeded eighty-six percent.240 The map below illustrates the concentration
of checkpoints in low-income communities of color.241
Note, the seventy-eight percent only accounts for individuals eighteen years of age and over.
This estimate is therefore likely under inclusive as it does not account for individuals that are
seventeen years of age, who are legally permitted to drive in New York State.
237. SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEP’T, supra note 51.
238. Given that only seventy-eight percent of the population is of driving age, the
disproportionate impact on Black and Hispanic or Latinx individuals is likely even more
drastic than these statistics indicate. If Black individuals account for 7.2% of the driving-age
population (as they do for the general population), only about 5.62% of the driving-age
population would be comprised of Black individuals. If Hispanic or Latinx individuals
account for 18.6% of the driving-age population (as they do for the general population), only
about 14.51% of the driving-age population would be comprised of Hispanic or Latinx
individuals.
239. Complaint ¶¶ 66–68, Black Love Resists v. City of Buffalo, No. 1:18-cv-00719
(W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018) (based on data from the BPD listing Strike Force Checkpoint
locations by Census tract from January 2013 to October 2017).
240. Id. at ¶ 68.
241. Id. at app. A (based on data from the BPD listing Strike Force Checkpoint locations
by Census tract from January 2013 to October 2017 and U.S. Census demographic data
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Further, social scientists examined sixty of the Strike Force checkpoints
conducted in forty-six different locations from April to May 2013 and found
that of the sixty checkpoints examined, fifty-three—or eighty seven percent
of checkpoints—took place in predominantly Black and Hispanic or Latinx
neighborhoods.242
The sampling of data that follow demonstrate that various law
enforcement agencies across the country disproportionately stop people of
color.
1. Greensboro, North Carolina
The New York Times analyzed tens of thousands of traffic stops
conducted from 2010 to 2015 in Greensboro, North Carolina. Despite
making up just thiry-nine percent of the driving-age population, Black
drivers constituted fifty-four percent of the drivers pulled over.243 Further,
most of that fifty-four percent were stopped for regulatory or equipment
violations, offenses which police officers have discretion to ignore.244
provided by the National Center for Law and Economic Justice).
242. Complaint ¶¶ 56, 69 Black Love Resists v. City of Buffalo, No. 1:18-cv-00719
(W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018) (citing Scott Phillips & Andrew Wheeler, A Quasi-Experimental
Evaluation Using Roadblocks and Automatic License Plate Readers to Reduce Crime in
Buffalo, NY (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2781126 at 6.)
243. Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of Driving
While Black, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racialdisparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html.
244. Id.
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Furthermore, an analysis of data collected from twenty million traffic
stops throughout the entire state of North Carolina confirmed that on a statewide level, Black drivers are about ninety-five percent more likely than white
drivers to be stopped.245
2. Los Angeles, California
In Los Angeles, about nine percent of the population is Black; yet, of
the 385,000+ drivers and passengers pulled over by the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) from July 2018 through April 2019, twenty-seven
percent were Black. In sharp contrast, about twenty-eight of the City is white
and only eighteen-percent of those subjected to LAPD traffic stops were
white.246 A telling indicator of pretextual stops being used against people of
color for reasons unrelated to traffic safety: an equipment violation was listed
as the reason for the stop for over twenty percent of the traffic stops involving
Black and Hispanic or Latinx people, but only for eleven percent of the
traffic stops involving white people.247
An earlier report by the Los Angeles Times revealed that from 2015 to
2018, the LAPD’s Metropolitan Division stopped Black drivers “at a rate
more than five times their share of the city’s population.”248 In South Los
Angeles, in which approximately thirty-one percent of the population is
Black, sixty-five of the Metropolitan Division’s stops were of Black
drivers.249
Further, a California Department of Justice report recently revealed that
throughout the state, Black individuals accounted for about fifteen percent
245. Baumgartner et al., supra, note 23. The authors found similarly troubling stop
patterns in Illinois, Maryland, and Connecticut.
246. Cindy Chang & Ben Poston, LAPD Searches Blacks and Latinos More. But They’re
Less Likely to Have Contraband than Whites, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019, 3:52 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lapd-searches-20190605-story.html.
247. Id.
248. Cindy Chang & Ben Poston, ‘Stop-and-Frisk in a Car:’ Elite LAPD Unit
Disproportionately Stopped Black Drivers, Data Show, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019 11:05 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lapd-traffic-stops-20190124-story.html.
249. Cindy Chang & Ben Poston, ‘Stop-and-Frisk in a Car:’ Elite LAPD Unit
Disproportionately Stopped Black Drivers, Data Show, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019 11:05 AM),

https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lapd-traffic-stops-20190124story.html. To the Mayor of Los Angeles’ credit, in response this reporting highlighting
racial disparities, he ordered the LAPD to scale back traffic stops—the LAPD scaled back by
about eleven percent, and its Metropolitan Division by about forty-five percent. Poston &
Chang, supra note 245; Cindy Chang & Ben Poston, Garcetti Orders LAPD to Scale Back
Vehicle Stops Amid Concerns over Black Drivers Being Targeted, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2019,
9:30 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-garcetti-lapd-metro-20190206story.html.
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of the stops examined, while accounting for only six percent of the state
population.250
3. Minneapolis, Minnesota
In 2018, Minneapolis police officers stopped 7,195 cars for equipment
violations. Although the Black population in Minneapolis is 18.8%, 54.8%
(or 3,940) of those drivers stopped were Black.251 This is one indicator that
pretextual stops are used against people of color not as means to promote
public safety, but rather simply on the basis of race.
4. Illinois
Illinois law enforcement agencies conducted 2,272,384 traffic stops
involving Black, Hispanic or Latinx, Asian, and white drivers. While Black
individuals made up about fourteen percent of the populations, they
accounted for twenty-four percent of these traffic stops. Conversely, white
drivers were not disproportionately stopped relative to their share of the
population: they make up about sixty-four percent of the population, and
accounted for fifty-eight percent of the stops.252 This means that about
30.12% of the Black population in Illinois experienced a traffic stop in 2017,
while only about 16.26% of the white population in Illinois was subjected to
a traffic stop. Also, interestingly, traffic stops in Chicago more than tripled
from 2015 to 2017 and Black drivers account for the majority of this
substantial increase in traffic stops.253 Between 2016 and 2017, Black
drivers accounted for almost two thirds of Chicago’s traffic stops.254

250. Anita Chabria, Black Drivers Face More Police Stops in California, State Analysis
Shows, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-0102/black-drivers-face-more-police-stops-in-california-new-state-datashow?utm_source=Today%27s+Headlines&utm_campaign=0598e861beEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2016_12_12_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_b0435
5194f-0598e861be-81947937.
251. Mary F. Moriarty, Traffic Stops as Criminal Investigations: Pretext Stops Should be
Disallowed in Minnesota, MINNPOST, (June 6, 2019), https://www.minnpost.com/comm
unity-voices/2019/06/traffic-stops-as-criminal-investigations-pretext-stops-should-be-disall
owed-in-minnesota.
252. ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS, https://illinoistrafficstops.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
Other races were excluded from the study “because the counts reported for these races were
mostly too small to check for any sort of significance.” Id.
253. ACLU ILLINOIS, New ACLU Report Shows Continued Racial Disparities in Illinois
Traffic Stops, (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.aclu-il.org/en/press-releases/new-aclu-reportshows-continued-racial-disparities-illinois-traffic-stops.
254. Id.
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5. Nashville, Tennessee
Between 2011 and 2015, the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department
stopped an average of 1,122 per 1,000 Black drivers—this amounts to more
Black drivers than even lived within the county during the relevant
timeframe. Black drivers made up just 27.6% of the total driving-age
population but accounted for 39.3% of traffic stops, whereas white drivers,
who accounted for 63.8% of the driving-age population, accounted for only
55.5% of all traffic stops. Thus, Black drivers in Nashville were stopped at
1.6 times the rate of white drivers. Furthermore, between 2015 and 2016,
Black drivers were 113% more likely than white drivers to be stopped
between two and five times.255 Even more troubling, Black drivers were
374% more likely than white drivers to be stopped between six and ten times
between 2015 and 2016.256 This evinces the existence of significantly
heavier policing in communities of color.
Appendix 3






In 2015, the Las Vegas Review-Journal investigated law
enforcement data and found that residents living in the seven
poorest, statistically [Black and Hispanic or Latinx] zip codes
account for nearly two-thirds of traffic citations.257
Between 2009 and 2011, seven in ten people arrested for traffic
offenses in Washington D.C. were Black, and there were even
greater racial disparities among those who were arrested for driving
with a suspended license.258
In Nebraska, where Black people make up roughly four percent of
the population, they accounted for nearly eight percent of the traffic

255. GIDEON’S ARMY, Driving While Black Nashville, A Report on Racial Profiling in
Metro Nashville Police Department Traffic Stops 38–39 (2016), https://drivingwhileblack
nashville.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/driving-while-black-gideons-army.pdf.
256. Id.
257. NEV. STATE ADVISORY COMM’N ON MUN. FINES AND FEES, ADVISORY PAPER FROM
NEV. STATE ADVISORY COMM’N ON MUNICIPAL FINES AND FEES IN STATE OF NEV. TO THE U.S.
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS 6 (2017) (citing James DeHaven, Poor Residents Take Brunt of
Planned Vegas Muni Court Payments, L.V. REV. J. (June 15, 2015), https://www.review
journal.com/local/local-las-vegas/poor-residents-take-brunt-of-planned-vegas-muni-courtpayments).
258. Kathryn Zickuhr, Applying a Racial Equity Lens to Fines and Fees in the District of
Columbia, D.C. POLICY CTR (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.dcpolicycenter.org/publicat
ions/racial-equity-fines-fees/#_ftnref22.
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stops and were arrested incident to those traffic stops 16.9% of the
time, compared with just 2.6% for the general population.259
In Illinois, while citation rates across the state are mixed, there is “a
large number of law enforcement agencies citing [drivers of color]
at significantly higher rates than white drivers.”260
A 2016 review of traffic stops in Bloomfield, New Jersey revealed
that although the city is about sixty percent white, seventy-eight
percent of ticketed motorists were Black, Hispanic or Latinx.261
An analysis of one million traffic stops in Montgomery County,
Maryland beginning in 2012 confirms these same problems exist
there as well—that analysis found that Hispanic or Latinx
individuals are significantly more likely (and Latino men even more
likely) to receive tickets than white or Black individuals.262
An Oregon analysis of twelve police departments found disparate
outcomes (i.e., citation, search, and/or arrest) for Hispanic or Latinx
individuals.263
A 2014–2015 report issued by the Tucson Police Department found
a noticeable disparity in the issuance of traffic citations for Black
drivers: while Black drivers only represented 4.9% of the city’s
residents, they received 6.5% of all traffic citations.264 To a similar
extent, other minority drivers, including Hispanic or Latinx drivers
“received traffic tickets at a rate slightly less than the percentage of
each ethnicity’s population in Tucson.”265
Data from the New York State DMV suggests that drivers who
reside in predominantly Black zip codes in Buffalo are at least eight
times as likely to be issued multiple tickets at a single traffic stop or

259. Darrell Fisher et al., 2016 Traffic Stops in Nebraska: A Report to the Governor and
the Legislature on Data Submitted by Law Enforcement, NEB. COMM’N ON L. ENFORCEMENT
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Mar. 31, 2017), http://ncc.nebraska.gov/sites/ncc.nebraska.gov/
files/doc/traf%20fic_stops_in_nebraska_complete_final_0.pdf.
260. ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS, supra note 252.
261. Mark Denbeaux, Kelley Kearns & Michael Ricciardelli, Racial Profiling Report:
Bloomfield Police and Bloomfield Municipal Court (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2760382.
262. Measuring Racial Bias in Police Forces, ECONOMIST, June 22, 2017, https://
www.economist.com/united-states/2017/06/22/measuring-racial-bias-in-police-forces.
263. OR. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY OF POLICING REP. PER
H. B. 2355 (2017), https://www.oregon.gov/cjc/CJC%20Document%20Library/STOP_
Report_Final.pdf.
264. Amanda Le Claire, Police Ticket Disproportionate Number of Blacks in Tucson,
ARIZONA PUB. MEDIA (July 30, 2015, 5:07 PM), https://www.azpm.org/s/32764-tpd-releasesreport-on-traffic-citations-and-race/.
265. Id.
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checkpoint than those who live in predominantly white zip codes.266
The data likewise reveals that “drivers from predominately Black
zip codes are more than four times as likely to have their driver’s
licenses suspended because they cannot pay their traffic tickets than
those who live in predominately white zip codes.”267 The
implication is clear: drivers of color in Buffalo are
disproportionately charged and punished with traffic violations as
well as for their inabilities to pay the fines and fees that underlie such
violations.
A Buffalo Police Department (BPD) partnership between its Strike
Force and its Housing Unit further underscores these disturbing
realities. In 2017 alone, the nineteen officers on the BPD Housing
Unit issued 14,853 traffic tickets and made 3,278 misdemeanor
traffic arrests on or near BMHA properties.268 The racial and
socioeconomic demographics of the BMHA properties where the
Housing Unit spent the bulk of its time269 compel the conclusion that
it is more likely than not that the great majority of the people cited
or arrested were low-income people of color.

Appendix 4




In Michigan, the third most frequent charge leading to jail admission
is driving without a valid license.270 And, between 2008 and 2018,
seventeen percent of those jailed for driving without a valid license
in Michigan were jailed for at least one week. 271
In Illinois, police made over 43,400 arrests in 2016 for driving with
a suspended license—half the arrests were of Black drivers.272

266. Complaint ¶ 85, Black Love Resists v. City of Buffalo, No. 1:18-cv-00719
(W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018) (based on BMHA and DMV data).
267. Complaint ¶ 86, Black Love Resists v. City of Buffalo, No. 1:18-cv-00719
(W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018) (based on BMHA and DMV data).
268. Id. at ¶ 83 (based on BMHA and DMV data). BMHA’s population is about seventyfour percent Black and seventeen percent Latino; ninety-six percent of MBHA households
are classified as very low income. About thirty-five percent are under the age of eighteen, and
thus are largely not of driving age. Id. at ¶ 79 (based on BMHA and DMV data).
269. Id. at ¶¶ 80–82 (based on BMHA and DMV data).
270. David Guenthner & David Safavian, The Next Frontier of Criminal Justice Reform:
County Jails, THE HILL (Dec. 13, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/474213the-next-frontier-of-criminal-justice-reform-county-jails.
271. Ted Roelofs, Michigan Jails Filled With Unlicensed Drivers, People Who Miss
Court Dates, BRIDGE (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/
michigan-jails-filled-unlicensed-drivers-people-who-miss-court-dates.
272. Melissa Sanchez, Some States No Longer Suspend Driver’s Licenses for Unpaid
Fines. Will Illinois Join Them?, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/
article/illinois-license-suspensions.
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In Florida, law enforcement issued over 232,000 citations for driving
with a suspended or revoked license in 2017—more than five times
as many citations as were issued for driving under the influence.273
Convictions resulted from 53,000 of these citations, amounting to
over 600 new offenses each day across the state, and ninety-eight
per day in Miami-Dade County alone.274
Between 2013 and 2015, the Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department
arrested and charged 19,108 people for driving with a license that
had been suspended for a reason other than driving safety.275 People
of color made up an overwhelming proportion of these arrests—
Black people were overrepresented at a rate of 3.6x; Hispanic or
Latinx people were overrepresented at a rate of 1.1x. White people
were underrepresented at a rate of 0.6x for these arrests. (During
this timeframe, the Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department also
effectuated 4,391 arrests pursuant to a warrant issued for FTP/FTA.
People of color were also disproportionately overrepresented for
these arrests)276
Between 2013 and 2015, the San Francisco Sherriff’s Department
effectuated 9,312 arrests for driving with a license that had been
suspended for a reason other than driving safety. Black people made
up an overwhelming proportion of these arrests—they were
overrepresented at a rate of 7.8x. (During this timeframe, the San
Francisco Sherriff’s Department also effectuated 855 arrests
pursuant to a warrant issued for FTP/FTA. People of color were also
disproportionately overrepresented for these arrests)277
Between January 2013 and March 2016 in San Joaquin County,
California, 1,717 arrests were made for FTP/FTA and driving with
a suspended license. Most arrests had multiple booking charges, but
forty percent—or 693—of these arrests had no booking charges that
were deemed serious offenses, i.e. acts that reasonably endangered
public safety. While the average jail time for these arrests was 1.1
days, fifty-eight individuals spent more than three days in jail and
seventeen individuals spent more than ten days in jail for such
arrests. Two hundred twenty-three individuals, accounting for
thirteen percent of the total arrests, were booked solely on the charge

273. Whitelemons et al., supra note 20.
274. Whitelemons et al., supra note 20.
275. BACK ON THE ROAD CAL., supra note 11, at 13.
276. Id. at 16. Please note, there appears to be a typographical error in this source. The
data following the text on page 13 demonstrates rates of over and under-representation for
arrests made for driving with a suspended license in Los Angeles County, but the text
preceding the data mistakenly refers to “San Francisco County” in the second paragraph.
277. Id. at 16–18.
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of driving with a suspended license. These individuals spent an
average of 0.85 days—approximately 20 hours—in jail; however,
three people spent between ten and thirteen days in jail, and one
individual spent twenty-one days in jail, all for the singular offense
of driving with a suspended license, where the license was
suspended for a reason that did not pose a threat to public safety.278
Appendix 5
The grave lack of available traffic-stop data is problematic and, in many
ways, hinders effective policing.279 Currently, most states do not require law
enforcement agencies to collect and maintain data with respect to traffic
stops and persons patted down, frisked, and searched.280 As of September
2019, only nineteen states required the collection of data on every law
enforcement initiated traffic stop.281 When traffic-stop data are available,
society at large benefits from increased transparency and accountability,
which in turn also promotes better policing.
A. Lack of Data Thwarts transparency and Accountability
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1996 decision that held police could use any
traffic offense as a reason to stop motorists (i.e., pretextual stops) effectively
gave law enforcement the green light to disproportionately stop people of
color.282 Many courts have acknowledged that racial disparities exist in law
enforcement stop practices and have declared that “[d]iscriminatory law
enforcement has no place in our law.”283 Yet, racial data on traffic stops are
278. BACK ON THE ROAD CAL., supra note 11 at at 20.
279. See, e.g., POLICING PROJECT, It’s Time to Start Collecting Stop Data: A Case for
Comprehensive Statewide Legislation, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.policingproject.org/news-main/2019/9/27/its-time-to-start-collecting-stop-dataa-case-for-comprehensive-statewide-legislation.
280. The New York State Police did, however, comply with the Stanford Open Policing
Project’s request for traffic-stop data. It reported 7,962,169 stops from December 2009
through December 2017, and included limited data, such as the drivers’ race. Pierson et al.,
supra note 26.
281. POLICING PROJECT, supra note 279.
282. Whren v. United States, 571 U.S. 896 (1996); Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on
Racial Discrimination: The Racially Disparate Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 993, 1005–06 (2016) (“[T]he decision in effect authorizes racial profiling in
run-of-the-mill traffic stops, a common modern law-enforcement technique. By many
accounts, racial profiling currently is routine among state and local police in jurisdictions
across the United States. It has become an integral tool employed in the much-maligned, yet
nevertheless aggressively enforced, ‘war on drugs.’”)
283. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 352 (2001). “We are not unmindful
of studies, some of which are cited by defendants and the amici, which show that certain racial

DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS FOR NONPAYMENTS

Fall 2020

DRIVERS LICENSE SUSPENSIONS FOR NONPAYMENTS

135

seldom collected and these practices continue to persist, at least in part, due
to the lack of transparency and accountability.
Transparency—and the collection and analysis of data—is key to
understanding how policing works in all of our communities. It promotes
accountability, and in turn fosters policing that serves all members of our
communities effectively—i.e., good law enforcement. The DOJ has
recognized this in its evaluations of the Suffolk County Police Department.
In an assessment of the SCPD’s compliance with the parties’ settlement
agreement, it noted that the “collection of meaningful and accurate traffic
stop data” is critical to “ensuring that policing services are delivered in a
manner free from bias.”284 The DOJ has further explained:
By collecting the necessary data, and periodically analyzing
that data, the [DOJ] will be able to ensure that [the SCPD] is
conducting traffic stops in a race-neutral and non-discriminatory
manner. A robust bias-free training for all officers and recruits is
also necessary to train them to better identify implicit biases and to
incorporate the principles of procedural justice in interactions with
the diverse communities they serve. . . . [T]hese requirements are
fundamental to the continued delivery of bias-free policing. . . .285

and ethnic groups are disproportionately stopped by police officers, and that those stops do
not end in the discovery of a higher proportion of contraband than in the cars of other groups.
The fact that such disparities exist is cause for both vigilance and concern about the
protections given by the New York State Constitution. Discriminatory law enforcement has
no place in our law.” Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted).
284. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THIRD REPORT ASSESSING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
COMPLIANCE BY SUFFOLK CTY. POLICE DEPARTMENT 7 (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/file/844051/download.
285. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Sixth Report Assessing Settlement Agreement Compliance by
Suffolk Cty. Police Dep’t 6 (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-docum
ent/file/1054396/download. Without doubt, bias-free policing is more effective policing.
Removing bias from policing benefits both the citizenry and law enforcement. Sunita Patel,
Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for ‘Community Engagement’ Provisions in
DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 802 (2016) (“When police processes
are perceived as procedurally just, communities are more likely to cooperate with the police,
and policing, in turn, is more effective”). Not only is bias-free policing a much better use of
limited public resources because it ensures law enforcement focuses its efforts on true public
safety threats, it also fosters trust and relationships between the police and the communities
they serve. Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding Sanctuary Cities, 59 B.C. L. REV.
1703, 1761 (2018) (“Community trust is critical for effective policing programs.”). It protects
citizens against unconstitutional government encroachments while allowing for more
effective crime prevention. Thus, the availability of data also stimulates better law
enforcement practices, which in turn bolstering the public’s faith in our law enforcement
institutions.
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Similarly, data that a court compelled the New York Police Department
(NYPD) to turn over as a result of the settlement agreement in Daniels et al.
v. City of New York revealed significant racial disparities in pedestrian-stop
context—eighty-five percent of those subjected to stops by the NYPD were
Black or Hispanic or Latinx, while only ten percent were white—and
resulted in the Floyd litigation.286 In Floyd, the court ultimately found that
the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices were violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.287 The plaintiffs were able to prove that the City, through the NYPD,
had a policy of racial profiling by relying on data that demonstrated that: “the
NYPD carries out more stops where there are more [B]lack and Hispanic
residents, even when other relevant variables are held constant”; “NYPD
officers are more likely to stop [B]lacks and Hispanics than whites within
precincts and census tracts, even after controlling for other relevant
variables” and “are more likely to use force against [B]lacks and Hispanics
than whites, after controlling for other relevant variables”; and that “NYPD
officers stop [B]lacks and Hispanics with less justification than whites.”288
But for the data that compelled these factual findings, it is hard to say
whether the court would have reached the conclusion it ultimately came to,289
and ordered the reforms that it did.290
In short, the role of data in Floyd cannot be understated. The patent
racial disparities the Floyd litigation uncovered in the pedestrian-stop
context evince the need for analogous data in the traffic-stop context, not
only for the sake of transparency and accountability, but also to ensure
effective policing. It is incumbent upon policymakers to utilize the lessons
learned from Ferguson and Floyd—and across the nation—and require the
286. CATALYSTS FOR COLLABORATION, infra note 293.
287. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
288. Id. at 661 (emphasis in original).
289. “The Equal Protection Clause does not sanction treating similarly situated members
of different racial groups differently based on racial disparities in crime data. Indeed, such
treatment would eviscerate the core guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. If equal
protection means anything, it means that individuals may not be punished or rewarded based
on the government's views regarding their racial group, regardless of the source of those
views. . . . The Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on selective enforcement means that
suspicious [B]lacks and Hispanics may not be treated differently by the police than equally
suspicious whites. Individuals of all races engage in suspicious behavior and break the law.
Equal protection guarantees that similarly situated individuals of these races will be held to
account equally.” Id. at 667.
290. Floyd resulted in a host of policing reforms. Among other things, the court: (1)
ordered the NYPD to institute a pilot program that required “officers on patrol in one precinct
per borough—specifically the precinct with the highest number of stops during 2012” to wear
body cameras to record street encounters as a potential tool for accountability; (2) appointed
an independent monitor to engage in direct oversight of the reform process; and (3) initiated
a joint remedial process to solicit additional solutions from various impacted stakeholders on
how the NYPD should further reform its policing practices. Id. at 668, 676, 685–87.
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collection and analysis of data with respect to all police stops. It should not
take lawsuits and settlement agreements for law enforcement to be
transparent and held to account. Relevant data should be made publicly
available and law enforcement should be analyzing and engaging with such
data in a manner that fosters better and more just law enforcement
practices.291
B. Availability of Data Drives Better Policing Practices
There is also real evidence that proves that when data are made
available, better policing practices follow:
As a result of the traffic-stop data collection practices mandated by the
SCPD’s settlement agreement with the DOJ, it’s bias-free policing practices
have improved considerably, though there is still much more that must be
done.292 Similarly, as discussed above, after the settlement agreement in
Daniels required the NYPD to provide stop-and-frisk data on a quarterly
basis from 2003 to 2007, the significant racial disparities uncovered led to
the commencement of Floyd, which ultimately resulted in court-ordered

291. See, e.g., SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR., Police and Data Collection: Why
Louisiana Needs Reform (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/20181115/police-anddata-collection-why-louisiana-needs-reform.
Good governance is just as dependent on data. Governments constantly collect,
analyze, and disseminate data to keep the public informed about everything from
economic trends to the projected paths of hurricanes, from comparisons of student
loan options to the spread of infectious diseases. If government policies are not
data-driven, it is hard for government to be effective. It is no surprise, then, that
data are just as important to policing as they are to the rest of daily life . . . .
Providing public access to data also increases transparency and helps build trust
with the communities served by law enforcement, which is important for
developing collaborative solutions to reduce crime . . . . In contrast, when police do
not make data available, this frustrates public accountability and effective police
work. As a former FBI director put it in 2015 when responding to a question from
a member of Congress about police uses of force, ‘[W]e can’t have an informed
discussion because we don’t have data. People have data about who went to a movie
last weekend or how many books were sold or how many cases of the flu walked
into an emergency room, and I cannot tell you how many people were shot by police
in the United States last month, last year, or anything about the demographics, and
that’s a very bad place to be.’
Id.
292. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Third Report Assessing Settlement Agreement
Compliance by Suffolk Cty, Police Dep’t (April 18, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/
crt/file/844051/download with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Seventh Report Assessing Settlement
Agreement Compliance by Suffolk Cty. Police Dep’t (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/
file/844051/download.
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“NYPD reform practices and policies related to stop and frisk to conform
with the requirements of the [U.S.] Constitution.”.293
Likewise, in Maryland, when the state police, pursuant to a settlement
agreement, were required to maintain statistics on the race and ethnicity of
drivers stopped, racial disparities in traffic stops were cut in half.294 In
Illinois, where law enforcement agencies have been required to document
and report traffic stops to the Illinois Department of Transportation since
2004, law enforcement agencies are able to assess the effectiveness and
unintended consequences of their strategies, and compare themselves to each
other to improve practices.295 A consent decree between New Jersey and the
DOJ, which required “the design and implementation of management
information system to compile data on the patterns of enforcement and the
outcomes of vehicle stops and searches,” led to extensive reforms in the
training and supervision of state police troopers. 296 However, because of
data, we know that there is still much work to be done. Despite seven years
under the consent decree, data has shown that the New Jersey State Police
were still involved in a pattern and practice of racially selective enforcement
on the New Jersey Turnpike and other nearby state highways.297 In Los
Angeles, a report revealed that from 2015 to 2018, the LAPD’s Metropolitan
Division stopped Black drivers “at a rate more than five times their share of
the city’s population.”298 The Mayor, in response to the data in the report,
ordered the LAPD to scale back traffic stops—the LAPD scaled back by
about eleven percent, and its Metropolitan Division by about forty-five
percent.299
In the legislative context, North Carolina was the first state in the nation
to mandate the collection of traffic-stop data. As a result of that law,
researchers were able to validate the racial profiling concerns of the
lawmakers who enacted it: “two-to-one search rates [and] two-to-one
increased likelihood of being pulled over if you are nonwhite.”300 A number
293. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 671; CATALYSTS FOR COLLABORATION, Case Study: Floyd
v. City of New York, https://catalystsforcollaboration.org/casestudy/nycfloyd.html (last visited
Jan 2., 2020).
294. Michael A. Fletcher, The Stop: Racial Profiling of Drivers Leaves Legacy of Anger
and Fear, THE UNDEFEATED, https://theundefeated.com/features/the-stop-national-geogra
phic-anquan-boldin-racial-profiling-of-drivers-leaves-legacy-of-anger (last visited Dec. 6,
2019). Note, the racial disparities were cut in half after a second lawsuit which compelled the
police to revamp their complaint system. Id.
295. ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS, supra note 252.
296. Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Profiling and Consent: Stops, Searches and
Seizures after Soto, Presented at the 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Oct.
2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641326.
297. Id.
298. Chang & Poston, supra note 248.
299. Chang & Poston, supra note 246. Cindy Chang & Ben Boston, supra note 249.
300. Isidoro Rodriguez, Why Traffic Stops Don’t Stop Crime, CENTER ON MEDIA CRIME

DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS FOR NONPAYMENTS

Fall 2020

DRIVERS LICENSE SUSPENSIONS FOR NONPAYMENTS

139

of reforms have been implemented in large part based on the analysis of data
that law enforcement agencies are statutorily required to produce.301
These examples of data serving as an impetus for better policing
practices make a compelling case for all jurisdictions to mandate the
collection and analysis of stop data.

JUSTICE AT JOHN JAY COLLEGE (July 17, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/
07/17/why-traffic-stops-dont-stop-crime/.
301. See, e.g., THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, NC Traffic Stops,
https://fbaum.unc.edu/traffic.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2019). For example, as a result of the
North Carolina law mandating the collection of traffic-stop data, “several jurisdictions revised
their practices . . . including requiring officers to obtain written consent before searching a
car during a traffic stop.” POLICING PROJECT, supra note 279.
AND
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